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INTRODUCTION 
The original inspiration for this dissertation came 
from Professor Miohael Roe and an article by Humphrey MoQueen 
I 
entitled, 'The Spanish Influenza Pandefuic in Australia, 1918 -
To a certain extent this work is an extension of 
MoQueen•s study. My personal pre-occupation with the impact and 
effects of the influenza epidemic in Tasmania has both a positive 
and negative side. Firstly, negative, because the reader can only 
assume that the situation in Tasmania correlated generally with 
the effects in the rest of the world• this being not tho case at 
all. Secondly, positive, because the author has used Tasmania 
as a typo of laboratory in which the viability of McQueen•s 
conclusions may be tested. For the sake of academic neatness the 
introduction has been broken into two distinct parts. There are 
two reasons. One, suoh materials as the origins of the epidemic, 
its charaoteristios, as soon, were inadequate to require a separate 
chapter; two, it is a necessity that offers backaround knowledge 
to the reader and effeotively introduces the chapters following. 
Hence its jwcta-position within the latter part of the introduction 
and the first chapter. 
The universality of influenza has made it a topic of 
disoueeion in all corners of the globe. The pandemic of 1918 - 1919 
added rnuoh to the impetus of this debate and encouraged the writing 
of numerous books and articles in almost every language. This 
immediately limited my aooees to the wealth of materials available, 
though English editions proved quite adequate within the scope of 
work undertaken. MaoFarlane Burnet and Ellen Clark•s research into 
the oauae and effoota of influenza is one such work. 2 An 
extensive analysis of the global effects of the pandemic by 
Richard Collier tackles the issue from a personalized viewpoint. 3 
However, the information provided is interesting and elaborate. 
A pioneering study by J.H.L. Cumpston, Federal Director of 
Quarantine in 1919, later historian, placed influenza in a political 
perapective.4 Cumpston recognized the need for a national system 
of quarantining so that a future epidemic may be fought in a more 
unified and systematic manner.5 He further emphasized that 
placing control of quarantine matters in the 'hands of committees 
6 
with very little experience in the control of epidemics• was 
inadequate. Subsequent events proved him correct. The author 
accepts the validity of this comment. The situation in Tasmania 
differed little to that on the mainland and oa.n only reinforce 
Cumpston's view. 
Burnet and Clark urged the study of influenza because 
'of the poasible imminence of another great pandemic arising •••• , 7 
Thia appearo to be the cri terif of many medical historians who are cr,1 
working even now to find an effective answer to the control of 
influenza. On the International scene the main function of the 
W.H.O. Influenza Surveillance Centre is to maintain a oonato.nt 
vigilance over the entire i1orld. 8 They must detect and erase 
influenza unless the nightmarish ghost of 1918 - 1919 may ariue 
once more from the ashes. 
Locally, there has been little done on influenza in 
Tasmania. An unpublished article by Humphrey McQueen entitled, 
'The Spanish Influenza. Pandemic in Australia., 1918 - 1919• made 
small refnrE:inces to the impact of the disease in Tasmania. However, 
it was invaluable as a hypothetical base which could test the 
validity of my own work. For example, the author oan only reinforce 
MoQueen•s main tenet thats 
'if national unity involved loyalty to the Commonwealth 
as an administrative maoh,5e, the pandemic showed how 
little of it there was.' 
Tasmania's defiant stand against the federal authorities over 
shipping in April of 1919 is the one major illustration. Further, 
the author cannot deny the validity of MoQueen•s second oonolusion, 
which in turn was derived from Lloyd Robson's The First A.I.F. 
MoQ,ueen does not reject Robson•a •theme' that the First World War 
wrecked 'Australian optimism and happiness' but prefers to stress 
his second notion that it created a •situation where ner,ative 
thought and destructive criticism could flourish.' 11 This 
proposal is accepted but not in the sense of long term implications. 
Certainly society was divided in its response to influenza and this 
may have been a continuity of the situation created by the war. 
However, 'destructive criticism' eventually found positive outlets, 
eepooially in the field of social reform. MoQueen•e analysis falla 
short in this reepeota Hie failure to take up the issues that 
\-1ere in consequence of the. epidemic lea.voe a sense of the work• a 
abruptness and hints that hie oonolusione may have been prematurely 
conceived. Thus hie work emphasizes the negative side of the issue. 
The author shall go one stage further than McQueen by analysing, 
in reference to Tasmania, the positive acquisitions reaped from the 
epidemio. Tasmania was not overwhelmed by the disease but instead 
took an object lesson from it and diverted that knowledge towards 
reforms that would safeguard future generatione from the anguish 
of another outbreak. I 
I 
The moat extensive study of the period 1914 - 1916 
is Marilyn La.ke•e thesis and book on the effects of the First 
World War on Tasmanian sooiety. 12 To the author, Lake fails 
to eive an adequate account, either politically or socially of 
1919. Peter Fagan sees the major reason for this type of mistake 
in Lake's pre-occupation with one issue. 
'In Lake•s work, the war plays the role of a central 
dynamic, and events are only oovsidered that are in 
some way related to the war.• 1j 
Its main inadequacy ie lack of information on the prevailing 
influenza epidemic. To Lake, it merely warranted one sentence. 14 
What surprises the author is that if Lake intended to 'Wl'ite a 
thesis' on the impact of war on society and politics, would not 
influenza come into her calculations? Some may disagree. However, 
many historians have linked the pandemic of 1918 - 1919 as an 
offspring of the First World War. 15 In my mind the two are 
inseparable. To Lake, the war created 'a fragmentation of the 
community.' 16 So too did influenza, though the effect was 
temporary. The two are thµs complemented. Aleo, Lake's assessment 
of the elections in May of 1919 missed one fundamental issue -
inflltenza. Tho epidemic was used oonaietently by tho Labour purty 
aa a weapon wi.th whioh to simul tatneoualy beat the government a.nd 
win votes over. Thia proved a oonatant theme throughout moat of 
1919 and reached a peak in August when the disease finally became 
settled in Tasmania. 
Lake's hasty assessment of 1919 also has other implications 
which lod her to omit further important issues of the period. For 
example, the eovernment•e response to the epidemic, the ascendancy 
of philanthropy, the dislocation of the economy. Finally, and 
perhaps the moat important ot all - the social issues and the 
,I 
I 
ovontual benefits reaped from the outbreak. 
It is hoped that this work will fill in these gaps. 
My object is to correct the imbalance created by Lake's work in 
answering the questions posed. 
The fact that this work is not only medical but social, 
economical and political, caused me to ranee throue,h a wide and 
varied number of sources as time permitted. Newspapers and official 
records were used. The former being especially valuable for their 
reports of Parliamentary debates due to the lack of a Tasmanian 
Parliamentary Hansard. The Medical Journal of Australia greatly 
alleviated the author's naivety as to the medical aide of the 
question. Articles in the History of the World War (two types of 
issue) added to and extended my knowledge of the pandemic. My 
search through diaries in the Tasmanian archives proved fruitless, 
however, the diacovery of A.P. Crisp•e Reminieconcee illuminated 
on the anguish felt by returning soldiers who were further detained 
in quarantine. Interviews with Sir William Crowther, John Reynolds 
and the once matron of Zeehan Hospital, Cicely O'Brien added a 
personal touob to my knowledge of the period and reinforced notions 
gathered from other sources. 
No-one knows precisely where the great pandemic of 1918 -
1919 began. It was thought by the French and other countries that 
the malady originated in Spain, hence the popular term •epanieh flu•. 
However, a more likely suseestion was that the 'grippe', as it 
was sometimes called, manifested itself in the rat-infected 
trenches of northern France where corpses rotted at the whim of 
the elemental forces. It has also been asserted that the origin 
of the pandemic was an overcrowded army camp in Kansas where a 
number of soldiers were struck down by the disease. From there, 
infected troops could have taken the virus in Asia and Europe.17 
/ In 1asmania, a contemporary in the Daily Telegraph 
observed that: 
•the physicians and scientists of the Allied countries 
have seriously considered whether the germs of the 
disease were intentionally disseminated by the Kaiser's 
government with the intention (of) weakening (its) 
opponents.' 
He addeds 
18 
• •••• the suggestion cannot be hastily dismissed.' 
Whatever its ultimate source, the fact remains that by 
the spring of 1919 when the epidemic had exhausted itself some 
twenty million people had died, 19 including eleven thousand 
Auatraliana. 20 As such, the outbreak of influenza, being as it 
wore an appendage to the cessation of conflict further demoralisation 
on a global aoale and added impetus to the deterioration of publio 
health, already at an all time low. 
'Spanish' influenza struck unexpectedly and always with 
a raoy effectiveness. The victim first experienced chills or 
chilly sensations, followed by fever, prostration, pain throughout 
the body, headaches and cough. The temperature rose rapidly from 
6. 
100° - 101° in mild cases to that of 103° - 104° in those more 
extreme. Shortness of breath✓,'' spitting of blood, and dusky 
I 
coloured akin from lack of'l~i.r were usual oharncteristics. If 
these symptoms were not successfully dealt with they frequently 
became pneumonio and hastened an end to the lives of those with 
heart and ohost complications. If the patient survived the second 
day when his temperature could rise to 104° then there was a good 
,I 
chance that he would be well on the w~y to recovery by the fifth. 21 
The most strikine oharaoteristio of the 1918 - 1919 
pandemic was its high quota of you:~hf_u,l victims in the 20 to 40 
___ ,,-
years age group. In comparison the influenza outbreak that struck 
Europe, Russia, Ingland and Australia in four successive waves 
between 1889 - 1893 showed high mo~tality rates among infants and 
,22 
old people. 
Reports of influenza in Victoria came as early as March, 
1890, however, the disease did not assume a virulent form until 
1891 when it reached pandemic prop«>~tions on a global scale. 23 
According to the Commonwealth Year Rook, in Australia, 1890, death 
rates due to influenza. per million of population were 130 follo,~ed 
by the epidemic of 1891 where the figure magnified to 739. 24 The 
faot remains that influenza, though not necessarily of a virulent 
type, had appeared in the Australian community since 1820. 25 The 
1890 - 1891 outbreak was a derivative of these earlier virus and 
its containment was due to •subolinical immuni-zation in the preceding 
26 years.• 
The 1918 pandemic on the other hand was a new type ot 
virua never before unleashed upon the world. Its subsequent 
' 
mortality rates were therefore staggering. In India, for example, 
influenza slaughtered five million persons; in Japan, mortality 
was around five per one thousand of population. Interestingly, 
in non-~'uropean countries the mortality was on the w~ile higher 
than in Europe. Burnet and Clark cite as inatanoee the Union of 
South Africa where per 100,000 of population 826 Europeans and 
21720 non-Europeans died; in Fiji it was 1400 and 5600 respectively. 
There is a suggestion that climatic factors such as high humidity and 
low temperatures may have much to do with increased mortality ratee.27 
In comparison with the rest of the world Australia was 
only given a glancing blow by the onslaught of influenza. Basically, 
the highest death rates occurred in those more densely populated 
areas such as New South Wales and Victoria. The death rates from 
influenza in the former being ae high as 413 per 100 9000 of 
population, in the latter, 329 per 100,000. Tasmania, by comparison, 
suffered a minor death rate of 177.28 
One reason given for Australia's low ·morbidity may be 
that those countries affected last by influenza usually experienced 
a mild death rate. Perhaps this is because the pandemic lost muoh 
of its virulence in its march aorose the globe and with the pasoage 
of time deteriorated in its destructive capacity. 
Spanish influenza did not actually invade Tasmania until 
mid-A~eust of 1919. Hith the disease ravaging the mainland from 
the early months of 1919 Tasmania had to pass through an extended 
period of anxious expectation in the hope that the disease would 
8. 
not reaoh ite shores. However, such hopes proved tutilet and an 
~~ttoffltlf mild fo~m ot the diseao• booatne apparent in Hobart. One 
observer calculated that it the flu was to attain the virulence 
reached on the mainland then the number ot deaths in Tasmania 
during the first six months ot outbreak would be 300 (per 200 9000 
of population). 29 The opposite was the case. Tasmania recorded 
a mere 177 deaths due to influenza during the course of the entire 
year. 
In accordance with mainland figures it was found that 
the disease in most of the country districts was not so virulent, 
nor the infection rate so great a.a in the congested areas of 
population. In Hobart and Launceston, for example, 65 and 28 oases 
of death due to influenza were recorded respectively. In comparison 
areas such ae Brighton (one death), Huon (one death), Latrobe 
(three deaths), and Bothwell (one death), experienced a very mild 
'pandemic' indeed, Interestingly eno/4h Zeeha.n and Devonport, 
dietricts of sizeable proportions reported deaths of only 2 and 
30 10 respectively. Perhaps this is indicative on a miniature 
scale of the one consistent, global charaoterintio of tho flu -
that its virulence diminished ae it travelled from the centre of 
urban population to that of the outlying, rural districts where 
population is more scattered. 
Tasmania wns no exception to the rule that made this 
particular type of influenza attack the 20 - 40 year age croup. 
During the crisis period of August - September, 1919, it was 
recorded that 42.5% of the deaths fell in the group from 20 - 45 
Another general trend was that a higher proportion of 
males were struck down in comparison with females. This is not 
olenrly visible in the Tasmanian figures due to the mild fatality 
rates of 93 males and 78 women. However, the mainland figures 
are more conclusive with the death of 7,046 males and 4,943 
32 females for the year 1919. This was universal in its implications 
though not rigorously consistent. For example, a total of 82 
males and females, under the aee of 20 or over the aee of fifty 
years died in Tasmania due to influenza, 33 though with those in 
the latter group, old age was a factor in hastening death. Suoh 
figures as those whioh exist in Tasmania can only indicate the 
world wide trend, though it is not hard to perceive that something 
is wrong when a twenty year old boy dies instead of his eighty 
year old grandmother. 
Hhy was this? Had the adult population developed 
partial immunity due to the outbreaks of influenza in preceding 
years or was it because the young of the world, the soldier, the 
nurse, the factory t1orker, were physically and mentally unable to 
overcome the challenges of the virus due to the many privations 
caused by the war? Whatever the reason it is positive that the 
wretched state of the world and its inhabitants magnified the 
potency of the outbreak. 
Tasmania's experience of the global pandemic was of a 
very mild nature. Daily life continue in a relatively hum-drum 
fashion, punctuated by newspaper sensationalism relating to State -
Commonwealth conflict or squabbles over quarantine regulations. The 
relatively small number of fa.tali ties is an inte1•osting fact that 
bears comment on in the conclusion. Tasmania was very fortunnte in 
10. 
that it did not have to witness the wholesale slaughter of its 
youth or faoe an almost total economic stoppage due to laok of 
a labour force. The mildness of the Tasmanian outbreak makes 
it suitable as an experimental laboratory for ~~ing the effects 
of the flu on the p~~f the public, on socio-cconomio dislocation, 7 
in the field of politics, asi a weapon that sets the state against 
the Commonwealth or council against the State. There is no doubt 
that the presence of epanieh influenza accentuated quasi-nationalistic 
sentiments and channeled them towards a state of anarchy in which 
all turned to authority for help and simultaneously blamed them 
for doing nothing. However, from chaos order emerges. This is 
tfu1e in the Tasmanian situation. 
' '{ 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE APPARATUS OF DEFENCE AND CRITICAL RESPONSE '.ro IT 
On the sixteenth of August, 1919, The World headlines reads 
1 
'The Real Thing at Last& Influenza diagnosed as pneumonio• 
So ended a tremendously lon6 and unnerving game of \rlaiting. The 
Tasmanian public had been antioipating the visitation of Spanish 
influenza since the last months of 1918 when the disease first 
began to ravage the mainland states. It came as an almost anticlimax 
in comparison to the intense psychological fortification of 
Tasmania's morale through the medium of news papers and Cumpston's 
assurance that the imposition of rigorous quarantine measures would 
effectively avert the entry of the disease. 2 What followed was a 
show of State-Commonwealth, and to a lesser extent state-municipal 
antipathy which drove Tasmanians, at the point of one of the most 
fiery debates, that over shipping, to a bold confrontation with the 
Federal authorities. 
The invasion of influenza came almost as much of a surprise 
to the government as the people of Tasmania. The government's 
unpreparedness manifested itself in a variety of ways - in lack of 
facilities available, inadequate supplies of vaccine, generally a 
lack of organisation.3 Thus the onus for flu-fighting fell on the 
individual municipal councils throughout the State. Thie is the 
essential characteristio of the outbreak that provides the substance 
of the unfolding drama. Though this fragmentary attack on the 
epidemic implies the failure of centralism in reality the opposite 
is the case. Within the concept of influenza itself, the common 
foe, as in war, the seeds of unity were being born. This process is 
1. 
not spontaneoUB but develops gradually ov,er the period. 
In case of spanish influenza breaking out in Australia 
a conference was called by the Commonwealth government in November 
of 1918, 9 to agree upon a uniform scheme of operations for adoption 
in order to combat the disease•. 4 Even at this stage Doctor A.H. 
Clarke, Tasmania's Chief Health Officer and representative at the 
conference, was to admit with an almost naive confidence: 
• •••• there appeared to be a very good prospect of 
preventing the disease spreading to or from Tasmania •••• 
on account of (its) remoteness from other states and 
the greater ease wiih whioh sea transport oould be 00ntrolled',5 
No doubt Cumpston could quite easily be pictured as saying this 
himself. Important resolutions passed by the conference concerned 
the checking of public travel, the establishment of vaccine depots, 
the creation of epeoial hospitals and organizations of ambulance 
support and nursing assistance. Further, and this is where oonfliot 
began to emerge, It was advocated that onoe a state was proclaimed 
infected, the Commonwealth was to take control of all inter-state 
traffic, both by land and sea. It was this resolution that later 
created the rift between Tasmania and the Commonwealth. The 
conferenoo also insisted that upon the outbreak of influenza in any 
state all plaoes of public resort euoh as theatres, music halls, 
race meetings and ao·on were to be closed down. An Advisory 
Committee was to be appointed in eaoh state and headed by the Chief 
6 Health Officer. In Tasmania it was composed of Dre. Giblin, Lines, 
Moore, Sprot, Thompson and E.J.·'l'udor. Clarke took the leading 
position. 
Thus the bare outlines for state action had been established. 
A further consideration amended the Public Health Aot of 1903, 'in 
order to extend the special powers of th~ Chief Health Officer for 
th, pwpo,~ ot mo11 etteotivolJ oh~tm1ne o~ preventin, the uprea.4 
of this dieease•.7 In later debatee the extended powers of the 
Chief Health Officer, in combination with the persuasive powers ot 
the advisory board on the public, proved a powerful tooltor the 
State government to wield a.gaist Commonwealth •bullying'. 
Local precautions proceeded briskly from the early months 
of 1919. With the notice of outbreaks on the mainland thie prooees 
accelerated. However, overall organization and application of 
measures were poor. That tbie wae a failing of the government 
cannot be denied. If it had taken control of the situation at this 
point in time later criticism may have been still born. 
Frequent meetings of the local Medical Advisory Committee 
only came up with such well worn S\l8gestions as the compulsory 
wearing of the mask and to make an enquiry into whether the disease 
8 
was carried throll8h the mail. However, there is a positive side 
to the story also. Inoculation depots were established whioh in 
Hobart alone vaccinated 203 people in the first two hours of 
opening.9 V.A.D. and Red Cross workers offered their aasiat~noe to 
the-government and the co-operation of the Police Depru·tment wae 
10 
utilised to prevent illegal landings on Tasmanian shores. In 
February a special hospital wae equipped for use by Hobart at the 
Claremont camp. In Launceston, the hospital at Carr Villa was 
equipped for similar northern requirements. In addition the home 
for contacts at Olen Dhu was to be refitted and ready for emergency 
11 
use. Early in February the Claremont isolation camp was added to 
by one on Ba.rnes Bay, North Bruny Island. It was felt that the 
isolated location of that island was more conducive to the 
containment of the dioease. 
Further measures oonoemed inter-state quarantine. 
Passengers leaving Tasmania for other states were to submit 
themselves for medical examinations twice at intervals of not less 
12 than forty-eight hours within a time lapse of three days. One 
major set back of this scheme was that passengers from the N0 rth 
West and other less accessible parts of the state who wished to leave 
Tasmania had to travel to Hobart or Launceston in order to gain a 
l 
'clean bill of health' and thus a permit to travel. This situation 
was later alleviated by the opening of further surveillance centres 
such as in Bumie but not before much heated criticism was levelled 
at the state Health Department. 
This is a consistent theme of the period. The government 
constantly came under attack whether from the public, the municipal 
councils, the opposition or the Commo~wealth. However, such 
criticism, though sometimes petty, was not always destructive, but 
awakened the government to the need for a reassessment of policies, 
'"' that, in the main, oonoemed quaranting. Such a reassessment could 
benefit all. On the other aide of the coin criticism revealed 
governmental laxity in applying or the non application of quarantine 
regulations. In other words the government's unpreparedness was 
highlighted. 
Tasmanians were angry and flustered at the fact they had 
to secure permits to leave a clean state. They watched with 
impatience the absurdity of one doctor examining a roomful of 
passengers when it was obvious that they were all free from the flu. 
l / It was as The World stat~ a game of 'Round and Round the Mulberry 
I 
~. 
bush, but all the while being bound and gagged with red tape•.13 
However, the farce continued to expand to monstrous proportions 
when it was announced that it was necessary to charge an impost 
for quar,«!a.tine expenses when travelling from a clean state. It was 
complained that one woman with a child had to pay t10.10s. in 
excess fare while a fourteen year old boy had to pay a fare of 
/ 
A letter by W.E. Shoobridge is one of the best critics of 
contemporary quarantine inconsistencies; He cites numerous examples 
of possibly infected persons walking on to uninfected ships or vice 
versa. The last case that he describes reveals the laxity, if not 
criminal negligence of the quarantine administrators: 
'I noticed that on the last day just before we sailed 
that the attendant who came on board to superintend it, 
oame straight from an infected ship and mixed with the 
crew and passengers, within twenty four hours we were 
in Tasmania and might have brought the infection with 
us. Every day boats and steamers came alongside with 
mails, official~ and provisions and there was no attempt 
at isolation'. 
On Bruny Island quarantine was equally as la.x. Troops 
who pa.seed through this isolation center were supposedly to be 
kept under strict quarantine confinement. However, there was 
little or no attempt to keep them under surveillance and they 
wandered about the island as they wished and if infected passed 
it onto the Bruny populace. A deputation to Clarke pointed out thnt 
if the soldiers were safely guarded and kept within the quarantine 
area there would be no need at all for isolating any other part of 
the island - thus alleviating the danger and considerable commercial 
loss of Bruny inhabitants. This was one of the points that was 
later acted upon and many restrictions were removed from the Bruny 
5. 
. 16 populace and entitled them to greater freedom of movement. 
If these issues were not enough to set the Tasmanian 
public on fire then those of the mask and inoculation were. The 
former, because it was uncomfortable and impracticable, for example, 
when one is eating; the latter, because of its fallibility as a 
curative and the fact that many resisted it in any form because 
impure batches of serum still caused occa7ional mass fatalities. 17 
Cumpston defended the mask for a variety of reasons but 
18 
mainly because it gave a sense of protection to nervous persons. 
One doctor criticized the wearing of masks on the grounds that it 
was farcical because in the fresh, open air and sunlight the mask 
cannot be a protection either against the exit or entrance of the flu 
germ. Secondly, it was dangerous because all those who wear masks 
are condemned to rebreathe the vitiated air after it is expelled 
from the lungs. He concluded& 'Besides muzzling the people in 
the unhygenic mask what has ,the government done in a big wa;y-?• 19 
A critic in the Huon Times alleged thats 
•a large meshed fishing net bears about the same size 
relation to a swarm of flies as the common gauze mask20 bears to the influenza germs it is supposed to stop•. 
Even so, the mask was eventually adopted in Tasmania and by 
February of 1919 it was compulsory to wear a mask in a public place 
or conveyance under the threat of £10 maximum penalty. 21 This 
measure was not rigorously enforced until the actual outbreak of 
,I 
influenza in August when constables were instructed to take the names 
22 and addresses ot those not wearing masks in a public conveyance. 
Maske were quickly snapped up by the public and the 
government found it extremely difficult to keep up the demand. 
As a oonsequenoe a black market became established and prof~ta 
soared to 5~ higher than the flat government rate of 1/- per mask. 
When his attention was drawn to this fact ''the Aoting Premier 
(Mr. W.B. Propsting) replied that he would not aot to subdue 
profiteering because the public had already been informed that 
it could purchase masks from the Health Department at 1/-.23 
If the general public were aware of the pitfalls of the 
mask then they were obviously prepared to overlook them in acquiring 
the 'psychological' security they afforded. Another proposed variant 
of the mask was the affixing of formalin ·to all telephones in 
Commonwealth offioes or banks as a precaution against the influenza 
germ. 24 Though the odds aeah1at the mask were formidable it 
readily became a physical appendage of moat Tasmanians who oared 
about their own general well being. Its ~apaoity as a flu 
preventive, however, left muoh to be desired. 
Inoculation proceeded at a brisk pace but was frequently 
interrupted by irregular supplies from the mainland. In the latter 
part of January, 1919, Hobartiane and surrounding inhabitants 
gathered in hundred's to have their flu 'ehota•. Such was the 
unprecedented demand that the doors of oity hall were oloaed at 1 p.m. 
· 25 leaving many waiting in the streets to be inooulated 0 
Once again the Department of Public Health proved the 
aoapegoa·t. One contemporary observed that even though the Health 
Department knew that there would be a rush for flu •shots• they 
handled the operation by highlighting their inefficiency and ability 
h 
to bungle what was a relatively simple task. No provision was 
ma.de to regulate the work and to make matters worse only one surgeon 
was in attendance. The scene was described as suchs 
'People crowded into a room on the first floor like sheep -
women, children, men, girls indiocriminately •••• the doctor 
(was) jammed against the back wall hemmed in from every aide. 
The air in the room was stiflins and moist and people were 
fainting •••••• the health authorities should realize that 
respectable women do not care to take their blouses off 
before a room full of men•.26 
Such criticisms inspired the Health Department to move the venue of 
the vaccine depot from City Hall to the Mayor's court room where the 
task could be approached in a more orderly manner.27 
In the country the opposite was the case. Lack of 
vaccine forced many to travel to the major inoculation centres in 
Hobart and Launceston or go without. One observer credited such a 
state of affairs to the fact that the government had failed to 
accumulate a store of inoculation supplies in the preceding months. 
Only the invasion of tnfluenza prompted the beginnings of this 
process. Some of the larger industries,· .noteably zino and textiles, 
took the matter into their own hands. Arrangements were made for 
medical teams to oarry out mass inoculations on the job. In some 
oases firms tried to make,inooulation compulsory under the threat 
28 
of dismissal,, 
The value of inoculation as a flu prev(rltiti~.was a topio 
~-- . 
of widespread discussion with little or no oonolueive answers. 
I 
Cumpston claimed that inoculation should be more widespread and 
based this on some vague mathema.tig/aissertion which indicated that 
the ratio of deaths in the inoculated arid uninoculated groups were 
5 to 24. 29 In late 1920, Dr. W.Y. Armstroll8 9 a N.s.w. dootor, gave 
a. 
a better researched and conoluaive evidence in that profession's 
official organ. He estimated that of 11,972 patients, 4,155 had 
been previously inoculated, while 6,249 had not. The mortality 
among the inoculated was 10.7% and among the uninoculated 16.5%. 
Further, the mortality of those inoculated three times was 8.2% 
. 30 
as compared with 11.1% among those inoculated once only. 
Burnet and Clark acknowledged the value of inoculation but in a 
later edition with D.o. White concluded that vaccine reduces one's 
chanpes of catching influenza by one half. 31 
Quarantining also had political implications, federally 
and locally. Conflict between Commonwe~lth and State durine this 
period was intensified by the va~ious states unwillingness to co-
operate with the Commonwealth on the mat~er of quarantine. 
Tasmania complied to a point but finally broke with the Federal 
authorities in April over'shipping. The background to this drama 
was set in a unique emotional response to influenza, mainly 
advocated by The World .. that of total isolation. Both issues 
were emotional, both were prematurely conceived, and both furnished 
fuel to the fire of the other. Total isolation, however, emerged 
from the abs tract to be utilised by the· 'labour party as a. weapon 
against the Nationalist government. 
Conflict between Commonwealth and State demonstrated the 
extent to whioh the previously negocia.ted agreement had been 
corrupted. The thirteen point resolution of the November conf,irenoe 
of 1918 gave some cohesion to a shaky federal unity as many of the 
points were to do with interstate quarantine. It was the fifth point 
that was to later prove 'the gum in the works•. This alloweds 
'I 
•that upon the proclamation of any state aa infected, 
the Commonwealth government should take complete control 
~t ~11 interm1t~te trAfttc. both by 1Qnd ~nd sea, and 
that the states should render to the Commonwealth every 
posoible aid, and oo-oper~te in the effective carrying 
out ot the regulations•.3 , 
The act turned out to be a complete farce and the Commonwealth 
government was never more than tacitly in charge of quarantine. 
The various states, as McQueen emphasizes, favoured a free-for-all 
and bent quarantine regulations as they wished within the confines 
of their own borders. There was little or no appeal to a 
centralist policy at this time.33 
' The question of Commonwealth control came to a head in 
Tasmania at the end of April, 1919. Prime Miriater Watt threatened 
to withdraw ateamero from the Basa Stra~t service unless the 
Tasmanian government agreed to waive its restriction of seven days 
maritime quarantine in favour of five. 'Such further diversion of 
shipping would have proved dieaetroua f¢' the ailing Tasmanian 
economy. Watt's ultimatum intimated that Tasmania had broken th, 
agreement entered into by the November oonferenoe and thus was 
selfishly adding impetus to the national· emergenoy. 34 
The Tasmanian public retorted with avengeance and inspired 
the Premier. Lee's reply to Watt seized the essence of public emotion: 
• •••• by diverting shipping from Tasmania as proposed ••••• 
this state (is) already reduced to a minimum, wheat supplies 
almo'st exhausted, l'arge quanti tit:!s'' of potato and fruit 
decaying in the orchards. Any further withdrawals of 
ehip'ping would be d'isaatroua to pr:oducing and commercial 
interests. The state government realizes the seriousness 
of the position but' insit1 ta on protection •••• we have only 
sea cornmunicationa •••• ,35 
Papers suoh as The World and The 'Mercury were especially critical of 
Watt's aot and judged that interests (commercial?) other than the 
10. 
lives of people were influencing him and his advisors. 36 
Meetings were held in Hobart, Launceston, Devonport, 
Kingston and many other municipalities to reject Watt's proposal 
and pledge full support behind the Lee government. It was 
generally agreed that the disease had got into the Commonwealth 
through the careless application of quarantine regulations. 
Tasmanians were not going to let the same thing happen in their 
State.37 It was equally clear as Mr. J.H. Cleary, M.H.A. suggested, 
that the interests of commercialism lay at the bottom of the question 
and if the looal government allowed commercialism to pull the strings 
thousands of lives would be lost.38 Wa~t•s reply to this public 
furor and Lee's telegram calmly asserted· the need to allow ships 
greater mobility in order that: 
• •••• they should be used to the best advantage in 
preventing unemployment, misery and distress falling 
upon the w;£le community•.39 
A meeting of the Tasmanian Advisory Committee reflected 
the earlier arguments against submitting to federalist tyranny. It 
proposed seven points which, in essence, whole heartedly backed 
the government' a stand against the Commdm1eal th. These included, 
seven days quarantine to be adhered to, ;passenger traffic to be 
reotrioted as tho situation necessitated, persons embarking from 
an infected state to be examined before coming to Tasmania. The 
last three points related to the accomodation of special wharf lumpera 
for inter-state vessels and the adv¥Seabi;\ity of preventing passengers 
~ ./' 
leaving Tasmania who would be returning within six months.40 It is 
possible that political intrigue had a hand in the machinations of 
this question but never-the-less Tasmania never faltered in its stand 
against the Commonwealth and was rewarded by a low mortality rate and 
the postponement of the onset of influenza until the third week 
in August. 
Intra-state conflict was not as colourful as that 
enoountered in the federal sphere. Nor was it widespread. 
However, it demonstrated that even on a local level the various 
municipal councils did not intend to pay homage to the whims of 
the state government when it specifioally ordered them back on 
their own resources in order to combat the disease. 
,'7 
An editorial in The Advooate is typical of current looal 
opinion: 
'it is obvious that the State Health Department is 
doing absolutely nothing, beyond issuing instructions 
and writing letters to keep the influenza scour/ge out 
of Tasmania. Each local authority has to rely on its 
own resources, not merely in the matter of prevention, 
but in the treatment of the disease should it occur. 
Each municipality must be prepared to take in hand the 41 necessary arrangements, otherwise nothing will be done'. 
Perhaps this was rather harsh but it did reflect the antipathy 
that was sometimes apparent between the state government and the 
local councils. The Zeehan and Dundas Herald held a similar view 
and oritioized the Tasmanian Health authorities for playing a game 
of ohess in which it was waiting on the mainland's move.42 
One of the most heated local debates was over the matter 
of expenses incurred before and during the influenza outbreak. 
Animosity intensified when the government appeared reluctant to 
cover oounoil expenditure. In a telegram to the local authority at 
Ulverstone Clarke wrote: 
•It is impraotioable, for this Depar,~ment to undertake 
the responsibility of local hospitals throughout the 
state and each council should organize in its district 
12. 
'for the protection of the local people. The expenses 
of such orgaij~zation must be borne by the councils 
themselves'. 4 
However, this stand changed. Already overburdened and impoverished 
by months of flu preparations and maintenance of isolation centres 
/ 
the municipal councils proved a powerful lobbying force which finally 
persuaded the government to assist in their financial obligations. 
The government decided to refund all expenditure over and above 
the amount that could be raised by the imposition of 2d in the pound 
upon the value of all rateable property within each district.44 
(' 
The expenditure of Hobart 'amounted to r.3;'216.18.11 while that of 
r :1 
, 45 Brighton a mere £37.11.5 or Esperance £33.3.0. The government 
further undertook to recoup the Red Cross societies of Hobart and 
Launceston as long as their expenses were incurred under direction 
of the Public Health Department.46 
Arguments between oou.noil and:committee were isolated 
events but never-the-less'ocourred. Inrthe Huon various committees 
formed there after the outbreak of influenza almost usurped the 
council's powers by aesUfll~ng control of the South Bridge Hospital. 
The council retorted by stating that the, committee may have to accept 
responsibility for a.nythtng they do whidh is not authorized by the 
former body. The debate was not concluded until a month later. The 
local oouncil issued a statement which outlined the functions of 
committees as appendages of the council which were to aid in relieving 
distress and act as an advisory body to' the council. It also explicitly 
stated that the committees must not incur any expenses without the 
oounoil's sanction.47 Such confrontations resembled what had already 
occurred in the Federal sphere and highlighted the emotional tension 
of the time. That the Huon oommitteee were unsure as to the extent 
of their powers must point to a critic ,of the local council's failure 
to outline a plan of action and the subsequent role of committees 
within that plan. 
On the whole local dissension was minimal and the period 
revealed no serious rifts between council and State government. 
If they did occur they were quickly compromised. Diesatisfaotion 
arose mainly out of the strict enforcement of regulations in areas 
that were free of influenza. .. such as Launceston, after the outbreak 
in Hobart. In relation to this point protest also oocurred when the 
Health Department refused to lift quaran~ine measures pending further 
outbreaks. Zeeha.n, for example, under strong protest, had to continue 
with qua~antine until December.48 In the long run municipal councils 
were too busy preparing for the flu in th~ir own district without 
combating the State Health Department. If centralism did not exist 
then influenza suppressed any further fragmentation. 
The faot that Tasmania had postponed the penetration of 
influenza for months after it had become virulent on the mainland 
added impetus to a policy of strict isolation of the State. 'No 
landings• was a policy advocated by The World as early as January, 1919, 
and was consistently followed throueh in a bull-headed and stubborn 
fashion until the actual outbreak of influenza in August. Such a 
stand had blatant political dimensions and was used by the labour 
party to manipulate the emotions of the time against the Nationalist 
government. 
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A peculiar aspeot of the isolation oonfliot, which reinforces 
the above notion, was that out of thirt•~n or fourteen current newspapers 
only The World and a handful of others advocated it as a serious method 
of aotion. The Launceston Ex~~ in a more realistic approach 
pointed out that oompleto isolation from the mainland would lead 
Tasmania into oonflict with the Commonwealth over the agreement 
reached at the November oonferenoe. Further, and this appeared to 
be a very fundamental point overlooked by The World, under the polioy 
of •no landings• it would have been extremely difficult to make 
arrangements for the return of Tasmanian soldiers.49 
According to The World, complete isolation of the State was 
a polioy that was gradually becoming to be reocgnized as the only 
effective method of keeping the disease out of the State. It further 
implicated Ulverstone, Wynyard, Devonportiand •to a degree Launceston• 
as swaying in the direction of this polio,-.50 However, my research 
of the local papers reveal no such conclu~ions. The World merely 
assumed the case was suoh 1or its own pol'i.tioal purposes. 
Dr. Clarke, too, was of the opinion that total isolation 
was a negative policy. FiJstly, because ,maritime quarantine law 
forbade it,and secondly, because he feltrthat seven days quarantine 
51 
was ample safeguard. The World could ~nly proclaims 
• •••• if it does get in then the authorities and government 
have let it in, for nobody denies that with isolation 
instead of regulation it could not get in 1 52 
Premier Lee took the view that :to isolate the State would 
merely aggravate the already tense Commoriwealth, State situation. 
Further, it would lend impetus to the eoonomio deterioration of 
Tasmania and create unemployment in its wake. Acting upon the advice 
of Clarke, Lee thought it :best not to contemplate taking any further 
precautions whioh would add to the hardship experienced at the 
present time.53 
Complete isolation of Tasmania was never a realistic 
apt)rou.oh to the situution and. ru:,t many took it as auoh. Baaiou.ll;y, 
it would have been impossible for Tasmania to survive months of 
isolation from the mainland without essential commodities such as 
wheat, flour, coal, and most important, communication with the 
outside world. 'No landings' was a political tool wielded by the 
Labour party to discredit the Nationalists in the coming May election. 
Their attack, at times desperate, had somewhat a shallow ring. 
Voters were not so easily fooled and subsequently returned the 
Nationalist with a huge majority.54 That the Nationalists at least 
attempted to come to gripe with influenza was a point in their favour. 
The Labouri tea merely criticized. 
Such is the background to the outbreak. The story after 
this period is that of the strengthening1 of quarantine measures., 
The outbreak of influenza reveals the effectiveness of their 
application to a reality and vice versae'' Criticism flares but is 
never protracted and conoerns 9 in the main, the inoonsiotenoies of 
quarantine measures. 
On August the sixteenth when T~smania was proclaimed 
to be 'infected' all libraries, schools, theatres, pioture shows, 
public halls and other pl~ces for indoor resort or public entertainment 
were olosed. Religous services were allowed only under certain 
conditions.. Forms of outdoor amusement such as military parades, 
races and football were prohibited. Hotel keepers were warned that 
the number of persons all,owed in bars at;any one time were three and 
this was for only a period of five rminutes.55 The public was thrown 
on the offensive by this shook enforcement of quarantine regulations -
almost at once critical retorts began to. flare. 
The local paper at Launceston rallied at the government 
for not fully explaining the implications and extent of quarantine 
regulations. It further pointed to the inconsistencies inherent in 
many of these measures. For example, it cited the closure of billiard 
rooms, which are large and well aired as a complete antithesis to the 
more frequented cafes being allowed to remain open and to as many 
customers ae they chose. 56 
Clarke did not escape this critical furor. One paper 
compared an earlier remark of his when he confidently proclaimed that 
Tasmania would not be affected by infl~enza with another which 
indicated that 'he was not surprised to find that it had arrived•. 57 
The fact that influenza had been discovered in the centre of population 
nearest the quarantine station did litt"11.e to strengthen the position 
of Clarke in this matter. 
Hobart was to be divided into six areas, with separate 
headquarters and staff, composed of a sanitary inspector, a clerk, 
two nurses and an area medical officer;· There was also a •comforts 
committee' composed mainly of V.A.D.s who undertook to assist at the 
homes ·of patients. Launceston was divided along similar lines but with 
only four districts. 58 ' In the country municipal councils across the',. 
state organized their own particular battle against the flu,fitting 
only loosely in the medical hier~hy headed by the State Health 
Department. 
' Patrols were established to 'guard against contacts mingling 
with the public. It was also propose~ to establish a oreohe to take 
care of the ohil<lr.en whose parents we~e ill. Elizabeth Street State School 
provided aooommodation for the first oases of influenza while 
alleviating the influx expected at Claremont. Attar Launceston•e 
first attack of the disease on the twenty-second of August it was 
decided to utilise the Wellington Square State School for hospital 
purposes - the reason being that Carr Villa was too distant from 
Launceston to be an effective emergency hospita1.59 
Additional nurses were employed at five guineas a week, 
not/ably, a guinea more than their mainland counterparts and two 
and half times the wage of a matron. This was 'danger money• and 
induced many to overcome their fears forr~aterial benefit. There 
is no doubt that nurses well deserved their wage as they worked in 
cramped, often dirty oondi tions, among mo,:-tally sic~ patients who 
could and sometimes did pass the dreaded disease onto them. Tasmania 
was fortunate in that the mainland experience, its doctors and nurses 
could be passed on to it and allocated to those districts where there 
was a shortage of staff. The Annual Health Report, 1919 - 1920 
concluded: 
•one is safe in assuming that the number of oases and 
mortality would have been oonsiderab60 greater if we j had to rely upon our own resources'•' 
Owing to the preoarious nature·,of volunteer and nursing 
work looal authorities were urged to aooept individual responsibility 
in the matter of oomponsat'ing for loss of life. 61 The Australian 
Provincial Assurance Company offered to insure the lives of voluntary 
ai~ and nurses in the Ulverstone diatriot at a premium rate of £2.15 
per 100 for twelve months on the oondi ti:on that the risk be confined 
to Tasmania and the age of the insured did not exceed thirty-five 
years. By September, 1919 the premium had risen to £4.18.6 per 100 
62 insured., 
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Once influenza had gained entry Tasmania's staunch seven 
days isolation was amended to three days surveillance after prior 
inspection. Ships reaching any Tasmanian port were allowed to come 
straight up to the wharf rather than go into isolation at Barnes Bay. 
However, passengers leaving the State were still required to obtain 
medical permits prior to departure. 6} As the flu progressed and 
passed over its critical stages further restrictions, such as those 
on the mask, public gatherings and religous services were pulled down 
until a relative norm was superimposed on the dislocation left by the 
advent of influenza. 
Complaints of State unprepareg.ness were justifiable in 
"' 
one sense. The Tasma.ni~ health author+ties being well aware of the 
virulenct'1, of the ;t\ridemi.? on the. mainlapd should have more ably 
prepared.~asmanian defences for the ens~ng plague. For example, a 
few days after the outbr~ak of influenza it was reported that patients 
were bei~g refused admi~~ance to the E~~zabeth Street Hospital because 
of lack Qf staff. 64 Measures that had been formulated late in 1918 
and early 1919 were now applied in what appeared to the public as 
desperate •emergency regulations•. However, the Health Department 
could not enforce these ::principles untill influenza. actually emerged 
within tne State. Otherwise social and economic dislocation would 
have bee'n much more ser.fous. 
Many quarantine regulations were inoonsiatent==granted1 
Not even, the mainland wd.s free from this complaint. Perhaps Roe 
confronts the problem wnen he theorises, 
'in any crisis men;aak where the ,blame lies; they oiten 
go from that to attack •••• a scapegoat is sought •••• , 5 
The local health board,was indeed the scapegoat with Clarke as the 
ri 
fooal point of oonaistent abuse. Cumpston offered another and 
entirely viable alternative: 
'The diffioultiee in connexion with the oontrol of this 
epidemic was very materially enhanoed by the attitude of 
portions of the daily press, whioh adopted and forced 
upon the publio a panio attitude whioh has not, at any time, 
been justified by the evfnte and adopted a sensationalism 
which seized every oogis ional incident to increase the 
public apprehension'. 
The development of quarantine regulations in Tasmania was 
a matter of •hit and miss'• Municipal councils resembled somewhat 
their federal counterparts in that they bent quarantine regulations 
20. 
to suit their own purpose. Thia did not;lend impetus to une of /l 
polioy direction or decision making. Quarrels broke out, not so 
much between council and oounoil but council and State Health 
l( 
Department. These were quickly reoono@ted. Many oritios, 
especially Labourites, pounced upon the ~nconsistencies of quarantine 
regulations as a lever to expose the failings of the government. 
However, even they must have acknowledg~d that the Health Department 
kept influenza out of Tasmania for over :-seven months - was this 
inconsistent? b 
Commonwealth, State wrangling~ were a common occurrence of 
this peribdo Tasmania was quite fortunate in having only one major 
' 
confrontation with the Federal authoritiios. Premier Lee's stand 
against Watt was essentially emotional aind in its wake intensified 
the shipping problem and economic dislocation. Against this it also 
prevented an acceleration of the inevitable influenza invasion. 
Perhaps the arrogant nature of the Commijnwealth forbade co-operation. 
It was typical that a State should stand up to the bullying tactics 
of a government bloated by the assumption of many state powers, which 
it had not returned, during the course of the war. According to 
B. Berzins this was one ijf the. major re~sonswhythere was a tendency 
towards State, Commonwealth oonfliot, with a further consideration 
that the war had fundamentally altered the terms of Federal-State 
relationa.67 Thus if Tasmanians were temporarily dieunified over 
influenza they united in oommon opposition to the Commonwealth. 
Others were more optimistic and8to discover the 
benefits and perhaps lesson that ma.y be derived from the epidemic. 
It was this minority of opinion that envisaged a swing from the 
current 'muddle through' policy to that of a centralist nature. 
Advocate concluded: 
, •••• if the ~pidemic~sucoeeds in placing the Health 
administration of the Commonwealth upon a permanently 
efficient footing, it will have broiight good as well 
as evil in its train9 .6ij 
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CHAPTER TWO 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC DISLOCATION 
The enforcement of quarantine regulations in Tasmania 
occurred as early as February, 1919 and continued until December 
of that year when the virus had practically exhausted itself. 
Ironically, it was not altogether the disease itself which accentu-
ated socio-economic dislocation but the regulations manifested to 
impede its progress. 
Moat sectors of the Taamanian~economy were affected but 
those which relied on shipping, such as the fruit industry, felt 
the blow hardest. Apples awaiting shipment rotted by the ton as 
commercial and health interests clashed~ Businesses such as banks, 
department stores, the tr'am,~ays and rai:Lways continued t<? work 
short staffed or closed &own altogether~ The police department 
and the fire brigade reported serious less to their potential as 
working units. Unemployment soared as enraged proprietors of theatres, 
billiard rooms and hotels were forced t~ close down due to influenza 
regulations and dismiss their employees. Matters were worsened 
because steamer fares and freights to and from the mainland increased 
by fifty per cent due to the dislocatidh of passenger traffic. 
Wheat, flour and ooal shortages occurred which temporarily deprived 
communities of the basic luxury commod:i;;ties. In the background of 
this was the foreboding 'of the national seaman's strike. The strike 
began in Victoria. early 1 in 1919. 'Dogi>,kennel accommodations• and 
higher wages were the main points of dispute. The sailors eventually 
gained sympathisers in all parts of the, Commonwealth and set the 
1 tone for a protracted shipping strike.:~ 
I, 
Laok of shipping was felt first and foremost by the 
fruit industry. A paradox intensified this inadequacy. Though 
the boats and their cargo were free of the virus it was almost 
impossible to take shipments back and forth between 'clean' and 
2 
uninfected states without human contact. 
As early as March of 1919 deputations of commercial and 
shipping interests were being sent to the local head of quarantine, 
Dr. A.H. Clarke, complaining of quarantine regulations. Such 
delegations expressed a. desire to relieve the congestion of cargo, 
particularly that of perishablo fruits, }that a. wharf should be eet 
apart exclusively for the unloading and '>loading of cargo and that 
\-c, \...:. . 
regulations were not~pulled down but merely elasticized: 
,, 
(, 
'each speaker was careful to point out that the 
restrictions should not be relaxed at the expense 
of public aafety•.3 
A further recommendation of the commercial pressure group consisting 
of R. Crosby of the Marine Board, Sir H~nry Jones, C.E. Webster, 
A. Ashbolt and M. Kennedy, F.H. Peaoook·of shipping exporters and 
Alderman Lamprill 9 insiaied upon the use and isolation of the Port 
Huon jetty for steamers to load and unload produce. Such a proposal 
was rejected by Clarke and so too the idea that the King and Queen 
piers at Hobart be fenced off and used as points of departure.4 
This demonstrates the extent to which the government was prepared to 
go in isolating Tasmania from the infection exhibited on the mainland. 
With elections two months away this was: a gamble, if not a brave and 
sincere stand. 
Fruit grower~ concern over inadequate shipping ca.me to a 
head in mid April of 1919 when a •mons~er' meeting was held in the 
26. 
Franklin Town Hall, Mr. D.E. Ryan, who presided, stated at the 
outset that, 'the meeting had no political significance' but went 
on to oritioize Federal inactivity in the matter. It was felt 
that the position of the fruit grower was precarious enough without 
the pitiful wastage of apples rotting in the orchards or on the 
wharves.5 However, suoh meetings were usually full of 'hot air' 
and did very little of a concrete natUl'ee They merely provided 
·' 
the locals with the idea that something was being done. One 
solution offered was that the fruit growers themselves should 
charter ~·boat to alleviJte the burden ~f the usual steamers which 
were booked six times over in referencer.to their available spaoe.6 
In face of oUl'rent quara.rltine regulatio~s such a scheme, if at all 
feasible; would have beert quickly quashed or, with a similar result, 
came under government j~isdiotion. Pe~iodic shipments of apples 
and other fruits were arranged by the g6vernment but never on the 
scale that the fruit gro~ers wished. The result was hugh losses 
in tho;ftuit industry and many of the finest apples instead of being 
passed·. along markets alf over the world; ended up as cider for home 
consumption. 
' ,: The shipping shortage maniferited other, derivative problems. 
Wharf labourers became v1otims of a redi tape force fa.r beyond their 
control.: Due to the higi number of water frontage workers in 
Tasmania their sudden ldss of occupati<ftl quickly aroused the 
government to activity. ~It was proposed that the government push 
ahead with public works 'in the Norther~ part of· the State where 
unemployment was the highest and offeriwharf labourers temporary 
positions. By early February these men were working on road works at 
the Great Lake aa ~ell aa Prosser'a Forest and Conden•s Road's in the 
2 
st. Leonard's area.7 However, many remained unemployed until 
tho resumption of normal shipping in August. The situation was 
not critical but in combination with the seaman's strike it may 
have reached a fiery head. That the government improvised a quaai-
R.E.D. scheme may have saved it further loss of face and provided 
a temporary stop gap with deteriorating labour relations. 
If unemployment on the water front was not problem 
enough then that of the nation wide seaman's strike affected 
Tasmania both politically and economically. The strike persisted 
until 1919 and recorded the highest eve~ man days lost through 
industrial disputes in Australian history.8 Tasmania was to 
28. 
experience the backlash bf this conflict but in combination with 1 
quarantine regulations it proved a serious threat to economic 
stability. 
As far as local unions were concerned it was not expected 
that they would be called up~n to take ,any action or participate in 
tho strike as such. It ,\<las obvious tha;t if ships did not run then 
they would have no work.{ All that a me,eting of the Hobart Chamber 
of Commerce could offer 'Was to call for,,,an assurance from the 
Federal government, 'that the shipping 1lervices would be maintained, 
and insist upon the unions oonoerned to,submit the dispute to the 
arbitration court'. 9 Much heated discussion ensued as to an 
alternative from seaman's strikes and dislocated shipping. 
One letter to rThe Merourx asked why it waa not possible 
10 for Tasmania to own and :control a fleetl of large overseas stecmshipa? 
In 'june of 1919 a meeting was convened 1<a.t the Launceston Chamber of 
}1 
,, 
Commerce to discuss the viability of State ship building. It was 
at this meeting that Mr. W.R. Bell, consulting engineer to the 
Burnie harbour works stateda 
'There are forces at work against the progress of 
Tasmania as an industrial community, particularly 
against ship building'. 11 
What these 'forces' were is not enlareed upon. This was not the 
only reference to the need for Tasmanian ship building. In February 
of 1919 it was urged that a boat be either built or chartered to 
12 
carry sugar to Tasmania. The cry for Tasmanian owned ships 
appeared to emerge at a time of economic crisis, falter and die 
once the crisis period haa passed. Even if ships had been prepared 
for local use they would r·still have been subject to Federal and 
local quarantine regulations. However the case, after the April 
J 
crisis, the majority of ~asmanians, save the commercial interes1a, 
preferr'ed the diversion o.f shipping rather than relaxation of 
quarantine controls. In(~aoe of the. influenza threat all were 
unanimous on the need to preserve the general well being of the people 
first and tend to the needs of the economy second. By the out-break. 
of influenza in August when normal sea iraffio was resumed all notions 
of Tasman-ian ahip buildillllg were dropped;because of the ereat expenses 
involved. 
" I~oonomic dete~ioration perais'ted. In May reports of wheat 
and flour shortages came,from all over ~he State. The wheat situation 
waa alleviated to some extent by the ar~ival of the Kiltcbanka from 
Melbourne laden with 3,000 baga .. 13 c~al was sorely missed and the 
government called on ped~le to economise in this matter. 14 Petrol 
rationing became established. 15 Laok1,of coal was alao felt in 
industry'where two out zyf the three Mount Bischoff Tin Mining Company's 
smelting works were put out of aotion.16 A large shortage of 
sugar supplies waa directly attributed to the interruption of the 
. 17 Sydney steamer service. Shortages on the home front were bad 
enough in itself but to jam producers it was disastrous. Henry 
Jones of Jones and Company fame complained that unless more supplies 
18 
were obtained he would have to shut down his factory. In view of 
30. 
the great fruit losses already incurred by growers if the factories 
closed their doors to them then their year may have been futile 
labour. Fortunately, this position was alleviated by the shipment 
of 250 tons of sugar from Melbourne to be closely followed by an 
additional 600 tor1,0a from Sydney on the(Oonah.19 
' i ~ -
The effects of apa.nish influenza and consequent regulation 
enforcement was disastrous for the Tasmanian tourist trade. Mr 0 
E.T. Emmett, Director of the Tasmanian 111ourist Bureau, calculated that 
if each tourist had spen~ £15 in Tasmania then the total loan to the 
State would have been in' 1the vicinity o'f £150,000. 20 Outbreaks on 
the mainland and the enforcement of quarantine regulations in 
Taomania'assured the los~ of the expected 10,000 in tourist traffic. 
The suspension of the Lobngana service accentuRted matter.a. 21 
Even by early March practically all prospective tourists had cancelled 
their visit. Subsequently, Tasmanian tourist advertising on the main-
land was 1oalled to a halt and staffs dialnissed 0 22 It is hardly likely 
even ff ·the epidemic left Australia within the ne:x:t few months that 
the ttade would have resumed at full stlrength. As the Director of 
'l'ourism concluded: 
• •••• the tourii;t t:tade (is) done for this season •••• 
we can only look f9rward to brighter prospects of the 
future' .23 11 •' 
The suspenoion of tour:l.13t traffic also had implications 
for those touriots already on the mainland or in Tasmania. In 
combination with a fifty per cent increase in steamer fare it was 
almost impossible for them to return at an early date to their 
point of departure. 
Large numbers of business men were unable to return to the 
mainland or vice versa. Those on holiday had to extend it, either 
because of lack of shipping or because they did not possess the 
amount to oover the increase in fa.re. One lady with children had 
to take in sewing in order to raise the fare to Melbourne as she 
objected asking for charity. 24 Much diDsatisfaction was aroused 
because of the government's failure to fntervene at an early date to 
aid such mis:f'ortunates. The problem, as with shipping was directly 
attributable to the striot enforcement of quarantine regulations. 
The dilemma. lay in the fact t~at steamer communication 
between Victoria and Tasmania. was restr~cted to once instead of 
three times a week. Additional quaru.11tfa1e stayover losses compelled 
shippers to impose a surcharge above no~mal costs to even out coot 
and profit margins. Many protests were ,made to the Federal authorities .. 
The line of argument waa that sine~• Tasmania was a clean otate it 
seemed inconoei vable that·. shipping oompai, should be allowed to place 
an impoai:tion of f3.,10s .. tier head on passengers leaving between 
Launceston and Melbourne.25 An example cited was that a man who hud 
taken his wife and childten to Melbourn~ was compelled to pay f.17 .100. 
. t f 26 in ex ra: ares,. If this type of expanse annoyed those stranded in 
Tasmania or the mainland it was enough to give the tottering tourist 
trade the final push. 
31. 
Meetings of stranded touristu both in the mainland and 
Tasmania plaoed considerable pressure on the Federal and looal 
authoritios to alleviate the problem. Many had been placed in a 
position of financial embarrassment because of theit forced stay 
and increased fares made immediate return almost out of the question. 
Touriai)"e petitioned the State's Tourist Bureau in an effort to gain 
compensation only to discover that it was not empowered to afford 
27 
any practical help. As far as the likelihood of possible future 
shipping was concerned all that oould be offered was, 'a berth as 
soon as circumstances permit•.28 From~ commercial point of view 
many owner~ of vessels thought it a profitless venture to return 
what they,considered a meje handful of passengers. Crews also were 
proving rebellious and asked for heavy increases in wages if extra 
trips were necessary. 29 i; 
Relief was finally afforded when it was decided that 
application could be made' to Chari table rtlrants Department for 
oompensatfon. Individual~ could borrow from this Department to pay 
for board land lodgings as'well as their ~etUl'n trip. The system was 
eventually adopted in al:r:states. Repayment was on the basis that 
the indi vi1dual reimburse 1ihe borrowed a.mount to his own State and it 
was subsequently passed ohto the Tasman~a.n authoritiea.30 
In addition to this the governments of New South Wales and 
Victoria petitioned the Tasmanian authoi:iiities to relieve stranded 
tourist·s from their respective states bf providing orders for board 
and lodgings up to thirty ahillines a week and passes home-. 31 In 
late February the Oonah ~1s chartered t~ return about 200 tourists 
to Sydney. This relieved much governmefftal anxiety but not the problem. 
Tourists were periodioally shipped to their points of departure up 
to and after the outbreak of influenza in August. The problem was 
such that not even the goverment could change quarantine regulations 
to alleviate it. It did, however, set by £550, 'to meet expenses 
•' 
1 32 
connected with persons stranded in Tasmania'. 
Industry was also affected. Following an increase in 
steamer passage it was decided that freights should rise substantially. 
One contemporary observed that before the outbreak it cost 11/- to 
send one ton of goods across Baas Straitibut now 18/6 was the rate 
charged.J3, An enquiry in'to the matter headed by Senator Baklap 
proved 
of the 
totally in./.effective. Admiral Cllilrkaon, the representative 
0 
ahi'ppera Holyman anci Company, advised that the increase in 
freights was due to the heavy charges imJjosed by the quarantine 
authorities. A vessel detained in ten days quarantine was at a 
cost of £234.7.10. in expenses. Thia amount was equivalent to 
seventy five per cent of the ship's freight earnings for that 
particular~ trip. 34 
That shippers h~d to personally bear the expense of 
quarantininp, and sit idlyhby as their vessels wasted time and money 
in isolation centres adde~ to their resehtment of state quarantine 
regulation.rs. It was fel ti' that such coats should ·be borne by the 
35 Commonwealith Government. ~. Many shippers had out back on the number 
of vessels at sea and in rone particular d.natance a company was able 
to make onily a trip and at half per month,~ instead of four under normal 
oondi tiona·. 36 Sending shipping to Tasmania was coming to be 
regarded as a profitless ~xeroiae and many diverted their vessels 
accordingl'y. Thus shortages in conaumer:v and industrial products 
were inevitable. 
King Island inhabitants fared little better. Interruptions 
to the island's shipping had produced a huge waiting list for 
embarkation to Melbourne. Agitation climaxed when it was discovered 
that the s.s. Koomeela was permitted to book passengers for 
Melbourne but at the exorbitant rate of £5.10.6 per head. Considering 
that the island is only about seventy miles from Point Phillip Heads 
it is little wonder that the inhabitants were in an uproar. A 
further cause for grave concern was that transportation of local 
products suoh as butter and cheese had been delayed because of shipping 
problems and the King Islanders were und~r unnecessary expense as a 
consequent. Freight rises accentuated this antagonism as no matter 
the nearness of the Island to the mainland it was still charged 
the standard rate of freightage. Econorrfic dislocation in King Island 
as a result of quarantine' restrictions xfesembled in miniature the 
situation in Tasmania. However, to the ::S.slanders the situation was 
much more serious because of their almost total reliance on income 7 
derived from consumer goods. 37 
With the outbreak of influenza:: in mid August and the strict 
enforcement of regulations under Seotiotl 23 of the 1903 Health Act, 
a new series of eoonomic'problems were pbsed to the government. These 
emerged in many facets of 'the economy but' especially in thoae affected 
directly by quarantine regulations. 
The Tasmanian public reacted oalmly, almost with a quiet 
acquiescence to the annoUhoement that influenza had penetrated the 
Island's defences. Noticeable was the emergence of the chemist shop 
issuing hundreds of different applications ea.oh guaranteed in their 
ability to ward off influenza. One contemporary observed that the 
regulations had an 'exoiting' effect on the people and they a.otually 
queued up outside chemist stores to obtain flu antidotea. 38 
Launceston's motto, 'lhsiness as usua.1 1 , 39 was a poor 
indicator of the true situation. Numerous reports a.bounded of 
employees falling off in their hundreds due to influenza attacks. 
Perhaps many felt it to be an opportune moment to taka a few days 
off workJ1 One large emp?oyer calculated that about thirty per 
cent of lfis hands were dtiwn with influeriza, though others, 'cheer-
fully rep'orted that they were only two or throe hands short and 
were carrying on and hop1ng for the best•.40 The effioienoy of 
the Poat Office, the Police Department and the Fire Brigade was 
greatly decreased due t& absenteeism. 41 
0 
Public transport was struck a. severe blow. Recent 
police harassment and bdbking of those found maskless on tramways 
led many: to find alternS:tive means of t'\-ansport. Absenteeism also 
added to this plight.. \tlthin two days iof the outbreak 60 Hobart 
trrunWaJ employees were struck with the 'disease and failed to return 
to work.42 Many foundi\t more convenfent to walk to their place 
of employment rather than face the ria~ of contamination on crowded 
trama -,or~ be muzzled with the uncomfortable mask.. Suoh wa.s passeneer 
fall off that in mid August it was con~idered whether or not to 
ourtail the service alt8gether.43 Maey tram routes were cancelled. 
Figures 'released by Mr. ;iA.C. Parker, General Manager of Tramways, 
revealed a definite turti away from pubaio transport. The total number 
n " 
of passengers from August 15th to the 29th was 142,700 and the receipts 
£1 9 312 in oompariaon with 238,000 passengers who paid £2,093 for 
the corresponding period in the previous year. This meant a 
passenger drop-off of 93,500 in a. single fortnight: 44 Rail services 
suffered a similar fate and met heavy lossea.45 
Many institutions and businesses were forced to run on 
a shorter davr basis. Banks closed at noon due to staff shortages. 46 
All shops, with the exception of chemists, druggists and friendly 
societies' dispena,riea were ordered to close at 6 p.m. daily. 
I 
Thea.tres 1, picture halls ::and billiard rooms were landed the heaviest 
blow. These were ordered shut immedia:t'ely with the consequent that 
many were thrown out of work unexpectedly. 47 
The medical profession was paralyzed by the number of 
absenteeism. Since Augtist 13th, 24 Ta.Mmania.n dootors were reported 
inactive due to influe~a. The majori~y of these oases occurred 
in Hobart where twelve ~ere reported, seven in Launceston and two 
at New Nbrfolk. Other dases were found in Swansea, the West Coast 
or the Midlands. That ~embers of thia~profession were in demand 
there is: no doubt.48 However, a. major theme of this period involves 
the oons'iatent lack of professional aid. The ceiling rates offered 
to voluntary nurses refieots an a.ir or' almost desperation in 
a.ttra.ot ing this type 0£ help. 
If nurses foiind the epidemiJ advantageous for the pavrriae 
it brought in its trairi"' then those oOl?fiheroia.lly minded did not fail 
to 'o'ash in'. One example was profitE!ering in the sale of masks. 49 
In the oountry_,essential bu.t difficult' to get commodities auoh a.a 
sugar, flour and ora.ngt:113 sky rocketed ;Ain prioo. 50 Booksellers oame 
to the fore with a. revolutionary oa.bin'et guaranteed to keep books 
I f 
free from infective sources. 51 While one contemporary prophesied: 
'The ~jet vender of ma.aka has not yet 
his presence among ua, with his c~y of 
probably only a matter of time'.5 
arrived, but 
•ma.ska' is 
Hotel keepers were also affected. Publicans were warned 
that henceforth the number of persona legally allowed in bars was 
three and for five minutes only.53 Seasoned drinkers could avoid 
this law by travelling from bar to bar but on the whole the industry 
suffered immensely. The blame ley not so much with quarantine 
regulations but because the public genuinely did not want to go to 
the 'pub' where the flu germ was reputedly in abundance. Strict 
enforcement of regulati~a which provided £50 for the first offense 
., 
and £10 for subsequent ~ffenses mey have also proved a strong 
driene~.~ i 
I; 
-i '· The closing of picture theatres, musio halls, billiard 
rooms and the partial slfu.t down of hotdls created a. perpetual 
problem of unemployment I for the government during the course of the 
scourge.-: Many tended to blame the local authorities for their 
plight rather than the disease itself.;;' Subsequently, debate, though 
not of~ fiery nature etsued. l 
l 
Within nine daya of Tasmania's infection, deputations of 
theatrical employees, a~tors and billi~rd room proprietors were sent 
~ -~ 
to the mayor of their town with an urgent request for aaaiatance. 
One mdmijer of Parliament suggested that a special bureau be established 
where'imem out of work dould register and temporarily :fill the places 
of those incapacitated 'through sickneda)5 Whether this went into 
effect :is not positivei1 The governmen't moved to the attack and 
decided;:tha.t it would ~'ontribute £500 ,on the pound for pound principle 
37. 
i 
:y 
to the Meyor•s fund of Hobart and La.unceaton.56 This fund was 
set up muoh earlier to aid the needy and relied totally on 
voluntary donations. This type of scheme waa established so that 
relief would be of a general nature and different sections of the 
oommunity could draw on it equally. The government's generosity was 
by no means confined to Hobart and Launceston for it offered to 
assist other funds started in the various munioipa.lities.57 All 
the same this did not appear to be enough for picture theatre 
deputations applying for government compensation oan be found as 
late as September of 19f9. The question of unemployment was never 
really settled until thirernoval of infiuenza restrictions in early 
October when picture th~atres were re-cipened along with all other 
institutions whether ple\sure or business alike. 
;;, 
, In the outlyirtg districts thi<s general pattern was 
repeated in combination 'with one other 1ma.jor problem - oommunioations. 
A major difficulty was ~hat in many country districts telephone 
opera1d.ons were shut down at 5 p.m. da.illy and 1 p.m. on Wednesdays. 
Thus 1f ine fell sick at"ter those houri then without transport it 
would h~e been near impossible to find medical help. A deputation 
to Mr~: DIEmden, Deputy Post Master Genijral, failed to alter the basics 
of this ;:htle. He felt that such calls• for assistance would be 
answered at the discretion of tho local poatmistreas. 58 
Tho mining population of Queenat own waa laid pro0t e by , )( 
influen~~. Perhaps the~hoavily congested working populace of this 
diatriof and its corres~onding high infection rate is another 
ind.ici:l.tar of tho viruleRce of the diaeru3e among tightly knit 
oomrnunifioa. Within thtee dB3"a of Hohltrt's infection a high proportion 
.j 
of Queenatown'a stores and businesses were closed down due to 
a.bsenteeiam.. Thia was eapeoia.lly manifest at the mine end of the 
town ~hero 518 men were missing from one shift alone. That same 
d~ only 12 workers ventured to present themselves for the after--
noon shift. These were sent home because of their insufficient 
numbers.59 The failure of ore shipments to arrive on time added 
to the low productivity of the Queenstown minea.60 The zinc works 
at Riadon and the Eleotrona carbide works were at first able to 
carry on in a comparatively successful manner. However, within 
. ·. d 11 61 a few months it was almost brought to a atan sti • Generally, 
large industry dislocation was minor iri comparison to the mainland. 
After the crisis period of August - September the work force began 
to return to work and by October - November matters were very much 
normal again. The shipping problem prbvided the immediate worry 
for industrialists for this representea their supply line to and 
from the mainland. p 
Industry was 'not the only sector of the economy upset 
by influenza. With the closing of aonbols many teachers became 
temporarily unemployed., However, state school instructors were 
39 .. 
given the security of normal pay during the course of the scourge,. 
Those teaching in private institutions 'were allowed no such compensation 
and f d t t t :t i t h ,., if t d · th t 62 were oroe o u or a pr va e omes, accep e, or go w1 ou. 
The example of council workers and the Public Service also 
reveals the government's desire to look after 'its own' first and 
foremost. It waa deci~ed that it woutd be 'fair' to pay half ,wages 
to those council emplofees stricken wi~h the flu,. 63 In the Public 
Service; Sir John Gellibrand, the Service Commissioner, announced that 
,1 
'provisions were being ma.de for permanent employees to receive their 
(tull) salaries while siok•.64 Even those who had been working in 
the Pu.blio Service for leas than three months 'will have their oases 
treated on their merits•.65 What then of the theatre employees, the 
billi&X'd room proprietors, and actors - all caught in the web of 
quarantine regulations spun by the government? All that was acceded 
to their request was the right to draw an insubstantial amount from 
the Meyor•s fund. Yet if some felt bitter then others were only 
too glad to accept something, no matter how small, to alleviate 
their immediate problems,~ That the government lifted its hand in 
defiance of the pandemio:•aided its popularity and allowed subversive 
la.bourite propaganda. suoh as advooa.ted 1-in The World to become 
tarnished in comparison. 
Sooio-economio dislocation of the period passed quickly 
through the crisis point of August - S6ptember, 1919 when a great 
percentage of the work force was abaenf from the job. The remaining 
months of tho year witnessed a decrease in virulence of the disease 
and return to eoonomio s,;ability. By ~'arly October Dr. Clarke was 
able to remove influenza reatriotiona that had earlier impeded 
economio progress. In :iindustry whether wharf labouring or the 
picture theatre, the Nationalist government extended its points of 
oontaot to all parts of the economy. Without its aid many would 
~> 
have been ruined eoonomioally or deprived of basic human wanta. 
ii 
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CHAPTFR THREE 
THE SOCIAL AND mmAN IMPACT 
Spanish influenza struck with the ineljctfable force of 
a juggernaut that overwhelmed all attempts at defensive measures. 
The inhabitants of Tasmania accepted it as part of a new adventure 
that was beyond their scope of understanding and mortal limitations. 
Reports of huge morbidity rates in Europe and even the larger, main-
land states, forced many to hold the disease in awe and finally bow 
down before it in a timid. submissiveness·~ 
The first reported case of influenza came from Hobart on 
August the fifteenth. 1 :The presence of the virus came as a climax 
, I 
to a series of rumours tlia.t had reverber·ated through the state for 
months previoualy. In ea~ly February of 1919, reports of apanish 
, 2 
infl\umza' stalking throughout the state '•were widespread. Many 
were of the opinion that possible contaeta had entered the state 
.\ 3 via small boats or fishing vessels. Contemporaries stressed the 
inadequacies of policing facilities. IR March of the same year 
rumour turned into fact when it was established that a fireman of 
tho s.s. Oonah had a severe case of pneumonia influenza. The Oonah 
was aubaecquently quarantined at Barnes 'Bay and in the following month 
develo~od another seven~een cases of irifluenza. 4 Considering the 
oloae proximity of Brun;t Island to Tasmania it is little wonder that 
a sense of uneasiness potrvaded in the isle. Another suspected oa.se 
of influ~nza made sensational headlinefil in early June, however, it 
proved without founda.tie"h. 5 The wordrsearched for when reading 
such headlines was •simple' in compari«on to pneumonia influenza. 
The forrn'1r had oonnotati'bns of a bad CG'ld. 
1 
Mere days before the official announcement of influenza 
many rumours, some wild and some with a grim touch of truth to them, 
gained circulation. It was alleged that the sick were being taken 
6 to the hospital in dozens. Perhaps this may have been overstated, 
however, in the country districts, contemporaries assert that 
influenza had ascendancy days before Ausust the fifteenth.7 At New 
Norfolk the authorities did not attempt to deny that Councillor 
C.M. McShane's nieoe died at Sandy Bay with pneumonia influenza one 
day before the outbreak in Hobart.8 Readers were given the calm 
assurance that, 'it often happens in the, case of epidemics that fear 
killf more ;certainly than :the disease' •9 ~ What was the object of 
Y\ 
Clarke and the Health Advisory Committee in attempting to hide the 
presence of influenza? P~rhaps to avoidls panic or allow time for 
further preparation. 
1) 
·Public disquiet~ did not end hftire. Many insisted that 
influenza.was carried through the mail ~)id other similar articles 
which were shipped from dn infected sta1fe. Throughout the early 
months of 1919 there was'a public demand for fumigation of the mail 
and indeed it was etaunolrly supported by some members of Parliament. 
J.H.L. 'Cumpston, the Dir(J;ctor of Federal Quarantine, muzzled the 
issue by ~tating explici~ly that the di~eaae was not transmitted by 
clothing 'or mail aa the germs die almost immediately upon leaving 
the body of the infected person. 10 In•May o:f 1919 the landing of 
five horses in Hobart catsed quite a stfr. These animals were landed 
direot'from Sydney, an irtfeoted state, lind taken to the showgrounda 
at Glenotchy. What put :i1 sharp edge ont: the matt~r was that the 
horses had been transpor'ted by the Oonah which held few pleasant 
memories for most Tasmanians being the ;bause of a 'flu scare' in 
l 
r:i 
March. The vessel was placed in quarantine but not the horses. 
The World, in issuing an attack on the Lee government cited American 
observers who believed that, 'fleas are responsible to a very great 
. . 11 
extent for spreading the disease'. Such issues were usually 
taken very seriously by the public and served to heighten prevailing 
tensions. 
The outbreak of the disease received an ambiguous response. 
To The Mercury it, 'had a sobering effect on many people who were 
inclined to joke about th~ situation'• 12 However, instead of a 
death like foreboding in the city there was a party atmosphere in 
which people appeared joyous that the waiting was over. Pent-up 
tensions were released in:'a spirit of gay abandon. One observer 
described the scene in Hobart as such: 
'All the afternoon people thronged the streets, and the 
greatest excitement prevailed. L'verybody spoke of the 
epidemic. The hotels were crowded •••• a great many people 
seem to have let themselves 'go' for there were more cases 
of drunkeness in the streets on Saturd~y night than one 
would see in a week of normal times•. 1J 
Sunday mornine in Scottsdale by contrast, 'was unusually quiet and 
for the first time in the history of the town the church bells did 
no:t . ', .14 ring. 
With the declaration of T41.sman.ia as an infected atn ta 
municipal bodies stepped up their defensive operntions - but to 
I ~ ~ 
little ava:11. Within theP space of twelve da.ya the di a ease had 
infected Scottsdale and ih another nine had reached Zeehan. 15 
u 
•1Enforcement of ;public heal th measures were acted upon 
immediately. Picture theatres, billiard rooms, music halls were 
,. 
closed. The most emphati,c advice given to the public was above all 
n. 
not to panic followed by warnings not to sneeze in the air, to keep 
f d i h d h k . d k. . 16 away rom crow a, tog ve up an s a 1ng an 1ss1ng. All were 
possible methods of contact. Yet still people came by the tramloads 
to patronize their local centres of amusement. When refused entry 
they wandered aimlessly about the streets eventually returning home. 
There were few 'flare-ups' due to a consensus of agreement that the 
restrictions were 'fair'• The postponement of MadameLucy Atkins' 
concert at the City Hall disappointed many but was accepted a.a 
duly necessary. 17 
'The one ray of sunshine emerged when Martin Dobrilla who 
was in the process of breaking his world} club swinging record was 
asked to vacate the National Theatre in cLaunceston due to the 
immediate imposition of health regulati~ns. He did so~walked onto 
the steps of the theatre 'and swung his a:lnba among the tumult of 
the crowd for another 25 minutes. Aftel.( this time lapse he gave 
up and retained the title:. 18 Women, too, demonstrated their 
resilience. If the mask was uncomfortable then many were determined 
it would be fashionable. One observer described the phenomena 
as such: :i 
'There are pear sha$ed masks of wii·e and gauze, pink 
masks resembling the snouts of pigs •••• several women 
wear 1 them like horse$ with blocks of camphor taking 
the place of chaff 1 • 19 
-< 
The novelty of
1
influenza wore off quickly. Within a month 
there was hardly any part of the State left untouched by the virus. 
Eight dayG after the infection of Hobart The World could report that 
the oity was 'almost deserted' and 'people are not inclined to leave 
i :~ b 
their homes, except some urgent cause compels them to go to the city•. 20 
The few who patronized the trams braved the cold outside of them 
rather than venttu·e infection within. 
~ 
0 
47 .. 
In the country the situation waa much worse. Under staffed 
and ill-equipped hospitals found great difficulty in coping with the 
influenza toll. Oatlande 'hospital', for example, was reputedly 
able to maintain a mere four or five patients in comfort. A 
consistent lack of doctors and nurses did{'-t)help matters. In some 
areas whole families were found dead. Telephone communication in 
the country is difficult at any time but especially when the service 
closes at 5 p.m. Only the more severe cases went into quarantine 
hospitals - the rest were forced to help themselves. In some areas 
there was not even a single doctor available. The most helpless 
victims of influenza were those living alone. If struck they were 
laid prostrate, unable to lift a finger to help themselvea. 21 The 
lareer cities of Hobart and Launceston appeared to have taken the beat 
of what help and materials were available - the rest went to the 
country. The experience of 1919 was to demonstrate that this was not 
nearly enough. 
The period provided a wide range of 'pet' antidotes, official 
and oommercial, to combat influenza. Dr. W.L. Crowther advocated 
inoculating the population with mild doses of the virus in order to 
immunize against a severe attack. 22 The plan was stillborn. Dr. 
Hislop ot Victoria, later stationed in the North of Tasmania, praised 
the preve~ve powers of amoking. 23 
Those commercially minded did not fail to capitalise. 
During and after the outbreak a wide variety of medicines were placed 
on the consumer market and apparently met a huge success. One 
advertiser recommended a dose of Conite and ~'upatorium or Phoenix 
inhalant or Dr. Mason's mixture. Failing these Arnold's original 
wine tonic was advised. 24 
The favourite local antidote was alcohol. Huge quantities 
of beer and spirits were purchased and consumed to the dismay of 
authorities. One hotel advertised: 
'Keep smiling: Be inoculated and drink Archie McCreas 
Quick Draught Beer: you'll be right•. 25 
Notpable was the increase in drunk.end disorderly offences. Fortunately 
for most offenders the court usually took their plea in a good 
humoured manner. One angry doctor in reply to the McCrea advertisement 
retorted: 
'Alcohol has no place in medicine •••• instead of being 
a preventive of any'disease it is the best possible 
persuader of all dis~ase, because it lowers ••••• the 
bodily resistance•. 2b 
Another critic claimed tnat: 
'In Danzig, followirie authorisation of cut price 
medicinal brandy, the tally of alleged (influenza) 
sufferers doubled overnight•. 27 
Fruit also came into vogue as a cure. Oranges especially 
were broueht in such huge quantities that a black market became 
established in their sale. The platform for one firm's campfz was: 
'I fe~r no more the dreaded flu; 28 For sun-rayed fruits will pull me .throueh'. 
If all this proved too confusing for the public then the government 
recommended the standard of Dr. Morse's Indian Root pills followed 
by a call. to the doctor~ Such advije was rarely acted upon firstly, 
~ \ 
becau~e ~f the unavaila91lity of docto~~ and secondly because they 
",J 
could do little more than recommend Heenzo and Heans to counter the 
after effects of an attack. 29 \ The most basic and sound advi1e that 
doctors could give was, 'fresh air, sunlight and regular exercise'. 
One member of the. profession noted one .. benefit of the epidemic when 
he concluded: 
'it is safer to say that the average man is taking 
considerable more care of his general health than he 
was a month ago•.30 
His final point is the obvious one: 
'why should ye not always take the same pains to 
keep fit?' .3 
!£ influen~~ h~d a dislooating Gffeot on the populace of Tasmania 
/ then it also proved decisive in Jtinging the church to the fore as 
,' 
a critic of the government. Such criticism was not political but 
merely over the right to conduct church services indoors. The church 
was seriously alarmed at the fall off of attendance and ralli~ at the 
government for transgressing on spiritual authority. 
A meeting of ministers in Devenport pointed out that in 
Victoria similar restrictions proved unsuccessful and therefore were 
of negative value in Tasmania. Permission for short services to be 
held was requested but the government stood its ground and refused any 
such concession. Indoor services were~later prohibited altogether 
through many ministers disregarded the regulation. 32 In Scottsdale 
a visiting Catholic priest conducted mass indoors and was charged with 
proceedings to take place at a later d1ate. 33 It is hardly likely 
that he was an example of government repression but merely acted in 
ignorance of the sinoerity of the regulation. In my reading nothing 
more is heard of the matter. 
The ohurch posed as its mairf theme of argument that the 
prevailing pandemic would incite the population to attend church: 
• •••• the manifest lesson of history is that in times of 
trouble and national calamity the, people desire to seek 
God and call upon'Him for help •••• 1 34 
However, the opposite ~as the case. Many preferred the safety of 
50. 
their own homes than risk contamination in a churoh. 35 The ecolessiastics 
·I 
were Rsking the impossible,. 
A practical member of the clergy wrote to The Advocate 
and appealed to various congregations to, 'religously put aside 
their usual fcontributions' as 'it maybe very hard for (ministers) 
in the coming weeka'. 36 One observer appealed against the 'impertinent 
interference' of the government •with liberty of conscience' and added 
that 'God', not the government, 'holds us for life and death•. 37 
Fear of retu:rning troops catching the virus in infected 
VI 
states and delayed family reunions intensiaed public disquiet. 
Relatives, especially, of soldiers, peti1ioned the government in 
d ti . th . v· t . 38 protest over ea n1ng e men 1n 10 or~a. 
The cancellation of victory parades and the quarantining of 
troops 'almost within oooee of their ownihouses' placed a damper on 
celebrations .. It appeared'that the Tasmanian public saw smoke where 
there was no fire. Soldiers quarantined at Bruny were of the opinion 
that, 'seven days further' detention madai little difference after four 
A .. P. Crisp remarks aione similar lines: 
• •••• I learned that we were to lie bff Portsea in quarantine 
for seven days .. What a blow it was, and how the devil were 
we to put out time in then.,.? Well,i there it was. We had to /40 
face it, and we had to go throueh with it - like it or not•. 
Local troops accepted their detention calmly and intelligently without 
following the precedent set by 'Gunner Yates' who was chargr,d with 
inciting a mutiny to break out of the Semaphor quarantine station in 
Mar ch of 1919. 4 1 
Quarantine conditions at Bruny were not altogether depresBing 
' 
though they were based along martial lines. Reveille was at 7 n.m., 
followed by breakfast and1roll call. Tobacco, matches and fruit were 
51 .. 
given out before the men reported for medical inspecti0n at 9.30. 
The rest of the day continued in a similar manner. A multiplicity 
of recreations were encournted., Soldiers spent their time fiuhing, 
swimming or playing football. The Y.M.C.A., set up three huge tents 
to these comforts the Red Cross continually supplied the camp with 
other luxuries as fruit, books and sports equipment which were 
collected from donors in Hobart. The camp chap€?, Reverend C.H. 
Sheddin ·concluded that: 
'All the men are contented and happy~~ fully recognize 
the necessity of their enforced stay'. 
" The mammoth task of organizing defensive measures against 
influenza and aid for the needy fell on the heads of voluntary 
' 
52 .. 
organizations and individual arrangements. Charity workers, associaticns, 
and long standing bodies such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army 
emerged as unselfish and determined social w0rkers. The State govern-
ment appeared unprepared to cope effectively with the sudden presence 
' ,. 
of the disease and encouraged philanthropy throughout the social ranks. 
i> 
Nearly a.11 munibipali ties open~d soup anci relief centres. 
In Hobart, £.50 waa given '6y the Liquor Trades Association to thf,l 
Salvntion Army for the establishment of a soup kitchen. The venture 
proved to be a hllf,e success with 120 gallons of soup being supplied 
th f . t d f . 43 · e 1rs · ay o opening.· Subsequent kitchens were opened at 
' 
Sandy Bayi New Town, Launbeston, and in all outlying districts. Soup 
was not the only commodity supplied by tMese centres. The relief 
depot at Albert Hall in Ltiunceston distr~buted milk, fruit, eggs, jam, 
flour, jelly, salt, matches and so on. All articles were donated 
freely aml' in abundance .. ;'Boy scouts helped where necessary and motor 
vans were available for transport. 44 
The Red Cross worked tirelessly to aid the sick and wero 
given enoouragement by the State government to act as they saw fit. 
Its main task was organization. Volunteer staffs were put on duty 
and the women's wartime military unit was broueht together to aid the 
Qt L~ungo~ton.45 Soldi~r~ returned to work enrly to 
alleviate the · 46 unemployment situation. 
In Hobart, a meeting of the local clergy and ladies 
resulted in the establishment of an Emereency Clothing Committee. 
This group worked in a close co-ordinatton with the Red Cross and 
accepted donations of blankets and clothes which were to be passed 
onto the needy. A plan was drawn up in(which the city was divided 
into thirteen districts. Each section was under the care of a minister, 
'who pledged himself to visit every house and report on the need of 
the sufferers•.47 
' 
Philanthropy a.l'so occurred on'<an official level. The 
establisnment of a Mayor's fund in Hobart was quickly :t'ollo1-ied by a 
similar set up in all parts of the stat~. The Hobartia.n population 
proved extremely charitable and donated"over £1000 within a few daya.48 
ill such monies were lat~r distributed to the needy, especially those 
faced with unemployment. The government, as a demonstration of its 
goodwill,'boo1:1ted the fund by contributing £500 on the pound for pound 
i . '1 49 pr. no1p e·. This was later extended to apply to all other similar 
funds set up in the different municipalities. 
·· Social and sporting pastimes ~ere dislocated by influenza. 
Race meetings were prohibited, football1 1 and all forms of indoor sport 
such as foe-skating were'ioanoelled. Wide disappointment followed 
the postponement of a proposed cricket match between Victoria and 
Taamania..5° However, such restrictions did not atop the aosemblage 
of 3,000 people at the Launceston Showgrounda for the opening of the 
Peace Loan Campa~gn. 51 
Public libraries were prohibited from opening at all during 
the early phase of the outbreak. Restrictions were later modified on 
the condition that, 'only ono person must be present in each room 
52 for every 25 square feet of space 9 • Meetings, official and 
recreational were cancelled. In Hobart aln important delegation of the 
Fruit Committee had to disband in the same manner as the Commercial 
Travellers Aaaociation.53 : Most lodges c'.\lld societies deferred 
meetings until after influenza regulations were removed.54 
Schools were closed for the laiter part of 1919 either 
because ,:of: staff absenteeism or eovernmeht edict. In the Hobart area 
schools'did not resume until early Octob:er. In other districts 
sporadic outbreaks resultM in the loss '6f the entire term and classes 
54,. 
did not' return until the 'following year.~ A not/able exception was the .,,>;-
Univerai ty of Tasmania which announced i?t;s continuation throuehout the 
scourge. 55 The flu oame:aa a welcomed ,break to students and teachers 
alike, the latter more so; beoau13e they r.·eceived full pay during the 
course of the epidemic. Many schools as a consequence were turned into 
isolati~:in :centres and hosJDi tals. The Education Department also placed 
the Centr~l Cookery School at the disposJl.l of the Red Cross for the 
56 purpose o:f making and distributing soup.:r, 
The social effents of the outbreak wore ultimately 
considerable. Due to pre~s reports, let~ers to the local newspaper, and 
so on, Tasmanians became interested and involved in their physical 
tl.nd l!Jocil!l.1 ~nvi:ronment. Within the spo.oe of eight or nine months the 
image of Hobart as a 'garden city' had been smashed and the burning 
fester of 'dog kennel' accommodations revealed. In January of 1919 
the Huon Timee reported: 
1 We in Tasmania a.re perhaps more fortunate in that our 
cities are not so congested and $~e existence of slums 
is practically non existent •••• , 
Seven months later The Mercur...l_ announced that there were many homes 
in Hobart 'not fit for any decent pig and that a self respecting dog 
58 
would turn his nose up at:'. L 
Philanthropy atid the quest for sociul reform coalesced. 
The establishment of the-Vigilance Comm~~tee, composed of several 
member$. of the clergy, which 'pledge_d •• •• to a house to house 
visitation to ascertain who were in need of Red Cross assiat~noe •••• , 59 
led to the 'diacovery' of whole atreeta of persons livine just above 
sustenance level. Some such places appeared like the West end of 
London described in a Dicikensian novel:•< 
'In a.ark back yards· 'a few feet square, sunless, sour 
0melling and littered with rubbish played the state's 
embryo citizens. Ragged and under·fed, strangers to 
virtues of self respect .... from their bg8Y lips dripped 
noisomely the jargon of the gutter·~ ... • 
.T,he Mercury could only conclude that: 
9it'is the kind of 1thing that breed.a Bolsheviks as 
well as the6~estilence that sweeps off people in 
~pidemics'. w i 
In a tow, with Reverend 'E.H. Hobaday of the streets of Argyle to 
Murray and Warwick to Brisbane Mercury crepresentati ves found houses 
. ,. 
with whole families down with influenza. In most cases the •rents 
were high', the 'fa.mi liE?:B large and the rooms small'. In one house 
a large ;?-'ug was placed 9ver a hole in 1ront of the fire place •to 
. ( 
keep you from falling through'. Other dwellings were found in 
which two families lived in a mere four rooms. 62 
Rents in such hovels ranged from five to eighteen shillings 
a week. Many were bound to find their only form of sustenance at 
the local Salvation Army Soup Centre. At New Norfolk it was' 
discovered that some sick people had only skirts and slacks with 
which to cover themselves. 63 
The Mercury saw the issue not: only as social but moral: 
'Decent houses very often make decent people, just as 
slums make human rats and city's thieves•. 04 
While Reverend Hobaday 4eclared that the owners of such hovels were 
n r 
•men without soul or a conscif~, men who are as callous as a camel's 
'. __ __,/ . 0 
knee• and deemed that a fitting punisW1!ent for them would be, 'to 
fl 
oompe~ t~em to live in yfe places they 
1
owned and by which they 
grew fat•. 65 
fl 
The slums of Hobart had been, an issue for years, however, 
\-, ' 
before the epidemic little wao reported to the public and subsequently 
' ,, 
nothing ;done. An overwtlelmingly bourgJois press, written for the 
bourg"fois, tended to sk;~te over such m14tters that affected their 
reader's1 oonsfio~ or purse. Hobert cfosgrove, later Premier, felt 
, ___ :_/'/ 
that this stance was assumed •to shieHl the influential owner□ of 
· b6 
slum properties'. 0:ne Labour speak~r in the House of Assembly 
declared that 'the LaboMI' party knew of these things years ago', and 
that two consecutive housing bills had been introduced but were 
defeated, 'by the soli~\opposition of the Liberal party'., He 
concluded by •congratul'ating the clergy on having helped tho Labour 
parti convert the govorllment•. 67 Irul.1cationa that many Liberal 
members owned such tenements were strong. 
The Hobart City Council answered its personal critics by 
stating that many houses planned for condemnation were all~ed to 
stand during the war. It was proposed that a Housing Committee be 
established which would delve further into the problem. Alderman 
Soundy felt that 'decent, hygenic houses could be built at £450 
a piece'. In a later debate the Premier revealed that £600 - £700 
was a more appropriate figure with provisions •to enable people to 
68 buy homes and another to~allow them to rent from the government•. 
The argument was not altogether one sided. The Vigilance 
Committee came under strong criticism f6r blaming the landlord as the 
whole source of tenants woes. Many ansJered, mainly landlords, that 
the opposite was the cas~. One critic put it as such: 
'anyone with an atom of sen./e (kno.¼s that) filth, bugs 
and rats and untidiness a.re the result of dirtiness 
and if people want to get rid of them, soap and wat59 and disinfectants are cheap and easily procurable•. 
L 
The Mercury admitted tha~, •there are tenants who will make houses 
p 
filthy 'but• we must trust to better eduoation for children and 
adults to improve these .habits•. It was suggested that prizes be 
" 
57. 
offered for the best ho~~ailing this,h penalties 70 for the ill kept ones. 
I J ~--4 
~/ ►·j 
By the middle of October the Housing Bill was brought before 
h ;, 
the House for reading. In its final stages it gave the government 
il 
power io •acquire land oi use crown la.:rid' on which to build houses. 
,_, 
,. 
Such accommodation was t;o be offered for rental or purchase on easy 
terms. . J'.t also allowed ~Mvances to thdse of • small means•.. The 
' ' 
building'of soldier's hdines was incorpdrated into this scheme with 
total operations expecting to require £70,000. The plan was 
'eventually to apply all over Tasma.nia ..... but first in Hobart where 
the need was more urgent• .. 71 On the twenty fourth of December, 
1919 the Homes Bill entered its final reading and passed into the 
history of Tasmanian social reform. 72 
Influenza incited a review of the sewage systems. 73 It 
also implicated the contemporary government and those that followed 
it in a tacit agreement to take care of the general health and 
surroundings of the popruace. Heal th was now a political and official 
issue and.the electoral success of a government would depend on its 
response 'to the issue. 
···. It was reported: that many houses had no sanitary facilities 
at all and arrangements were made with neighbours for joint use. 
I 
Three letters were sent '-lio The Mercu:ry; on a. single dey complaining 
of the bathing acoornmoda,ions at Cornei'ian Bey. One critic called 
them 'glorified pill boJies', and added that, •one shed has no roof 
so many bathers disrobe \n the open•.74 In early March of 1919 one 
observer complained of diitter condition~ in the Moonah area and 
inferred· 'that, 'two children caught typ'hoid because of this'.. She 
concluded, 'councillors gu:liters are cloan whilo residents who pay 
their taxes (are not)'. 7:P 
r 
In Tasmania th.78 influenza epidemic created a ViGorous 
,. 
and dynamic movement tow1ards social ref!orm. The government came to 
be viewed as the reposi iory of such mea:sures. Slum clearances beean ( 
in Hobart and Launceston: without 'f6;;'\or favour' and has continued 
until the present day .. '1A general readiion ensued that a part time 
health officer was not enough .. The Wo:tild called for •a full time 
health officer with a staff freed from the interference of interested 
and greedy musters'. 76 The housing problem moved the public mind 
and shocked people out of the a.pa.thy of previous decades., F'or many, 
all aspects of their environment from gutters to slovenly kept 
bathing sheds came under a new and critical eye. No longer could 
such a problem be swept under the carpet. Father Cullen, active as 
a social worker during this period called the plight, 'a living 
mockery of Australia's precious equal 9pportunity for a11 1 • 77 The 
machinations of reform had already begun. 
C 
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CONCLUSION 
In the introduction to this work several reasons were 
given to justify an intensive study of the impact and affect of 
influenza in Tasmania. First and foremost to fill in the gaps of 
what previously had been virginal ground. Secondly, to teat the 
1 
validity of Mcqueen's contentions as set out in his paper. 
What this really amounted to was to diaoover·if Tasmania differed 
from the example set on the mainland during the epidemic. The 
author's answer must be a firm no, witl:r one reservation. In 
comparison to the rest of the world Tasmania felt only the slightest 
effects of influenza. Even when comparing conditions with the 
mainland there appeared in Tasmania an enlightened view of the 
scourge.: Energy was nof wasted with d€spair but channeled into 
social' reform. Thirdly, to correct the: imbalance created by 
Marilyn Lake's hasty oo~erage of 1919.~ My fourth point may have 
become, apparent to the ~eader throughout the pages of the thesis 
the topsy-turvy, 'hit a.rld miss• na.ture11of state quarantine 
regulationo and in reference to the April affair the apparent need 
for a I<'ederalist approach to quarantining. 
,1 The work has sought to add ta knowledge of the influenza. 
epidernio in a number ofi,· ways. The Tasmanian government' e quarrel 
with the Commonwealth ewer quarantining would appear to confirm 
::> 
· MoQueen •la point that irl'fluenza oreatedi 'disloyalty' to the 
Commohwealth.3 The rfft was not permanent and was closed by August. 
ti 
·
1 The work ha.s 71also attemptedrto fill in gaps left by Lake's 
researoi of the period~ Though sooi~economic dislocation derived 
from the epidemic did not come under her topic the author feels 
that it io intcreetine as an indication of governmental response. 
The Lee government had many critics. Ho\-iever, it ia felt that given 
limitation of resources the role of the government du.ring the out-
break was a significant one. Financially it aided hundreds of 
Tasmanians to sustain themselves; stranded tourists were chartered 
special boats or loaned the fare to return home; the Red Cross was 
subsidized in its activities as were the municipal oounoils. In 
Launceston, those unemployed as a result of influenza were placed 
on quasi - R.E.D. schemes for the duration. Matters may have 
been much worse if the government had n@t stood its ground and 
allowed the ascendancy of commercial interests which advocated 
the pulling down of quarantine barriers. Its stand against Watt 
was perhaps over reactive and full of ~~11 meaning patriotism but 
did show1; its tenaoi ty and courage. n 
... 
• u 
,, Lake' a suggestion that aocie1iy was divided durine and 
after the war neglects the counter impatot of influenza.. Society 
may well have been divided by broken ideals, morale and torn by 
. "'h A angu11.:1 • However, the epidemic turn~d attention, if only 
momentarily from such itiner deapaire ~nether war had to be fought 
though noN the enemy waij inviaible-tf the war proved a great 
'disruptor' mentally then political rebponse to influenza revealed 
no such,ailment. The Nitionalist gove~nment•s stand against the 
Ji1 ederal "authorities was1;ba.cked whole heartedly by the Tasmanian 
populati'on. Influenza. ltreated a solidlhri ty because all were on 
the same side of the fJ'hce, all were b?eing attacked by the same 
enemy. Perhaps it mayilot be an exaggeration to state that the 
j 
Natio½alist victory in°ihe May electio"h of 1919 may have been 
~- J ~ 
aided by the public's general consensus that the government's struggle 
against influenza had been significant. 
However, divisions within society still emerged. Critics 
rallied at the government because of inconsistencies evident in 
quarantine regulations. In the May election the Labour party lifted 
influenza to a political issue but failed to make little impact on 
voters. Yet these rifts were not permanent but merely spo~adic, 
occurring at intervals throughout the period. For example, Labour 
dropped the issue soon ai'ter the Nationalists were returned to power. 
The Lake thesis, in failing to elaborate on the effects of 
(j"t_'t_.f" 
influenza in Tasmania, paased~ma.ny important issues of the period. 
For example, if people ~ere disilluaioried idealists they were never-
the-les's 0magmatista who did not neglect; their fellow man. A 
oonaia-\ient theme of the period is philanthropy in all of its mani-
f esta tio~~. The Salvati~n Army, the Red Cross and the Church played 
a dominating role in soclal work. The ~overnment, too, played a 
part. ~Tffis experience w;s not unique 1!b Tasmania and according to 
MoQueen occurred in all mainland states. 5 
El 0 
' Quarantining was the dominan-tr theme of the period. 
Cumpstbn::was to report ~rematurelyz ~ 
•~ .'J .Australia was rthe only countfy in the world which 6 
escaped a devaating infection of IQOst exalted virulence'. 
\: ) J'. .t 
He add_ed , proudly: 
,. r 
• 11 ••• this escape W8JB directly and.solely the result of 
thetwork of the Commonwealth Quarlfrltine service •••• •7 
In coritr~st, H.O. Lancas"ter in The Med~cal Journal of Australia stated, 
"All;hough Cumpston rithought that quarantine had kept 
influenza. out of A~stralia, it is
0
simpler to believe 
fl 
'that the quarantine measures delayed its entry, 
and that had a more rigorous quarantine been practicable 
politically the influenza epidemic might have been averted•.8 
The author agrees with this assertion. Strict quarantine in 
Tasmania averted the disease for sever~l months. 
However, the imposition of qua.ran tine regulations was 
too haphazard. F.,a.ch state went its own way and bent regulation 
to suit their particular situation. Tasmania imposed the moat 
strineent regulations of all the states and refused to accept 
Commortwe~lth interference. Over all ttlis tended to be a •messy• 
1 1 
system wi'th more defects" than benefits. For example, if pne state 
left i'.;t;a,iports open because it was infected and another refused to 
open them because it waluninfected, tlien shipping ties between the 
two states were impossible. McQueen•s analysis fails to provide 
the answer to this dilemma. Though th~ epidemic did not have 
enougrr impetus to achieve the establishment of a Federal Health Service 
Roe aisesses that the 'chaos' created ~y State-Commonwealth wrangling 
over quaTantine 'had the potential for a reaction in favor of 
cen tra:lfbm' • 9 PotentiE.f.l became reality on the 12 March, 1921 
l 
when a. F~deral Health Department was created with Cumpston as 
directot general. 10 
' It is hoped that this work has achieved its objectives. 
First,' ifo break fresh g~ound and add to our knowledge of the 
epidemid1 in Tasmania. Secondly') to test the validity of McQueen' s c • 
aasum~t½ons and enlaree~upon his work.~ Thirdly, to fill in the 
gaps left by Marilyn Lake's study of the period - especially in 
relation to governmental response to 1Jihe outbreak. Fourthly, the 
author donsidered it crucial that Tasmania should have a place in 
the debate that resulted in the establishment of the Federal 
Health Department. During thia olaah Tasmanians were charged 
with 'having lost their heads' and being 'unfair' and 'unfoolish' 
' h d t t· 11 wit regar o qua.ran 1ne. It is obvious that the Federal 
authorities wished to avoid such a recurrence. 
The Taa~anian epidemic is unique in its ability to allow 
the observation of political, social and economic forces clashing, 
and at times, merging. Hence politics and social reform become 
entwineijt1 It ia from these clashes that our conclusions are drawn. 
~undamental to this is t~e human aspect~ the reactions of our 
histcr:l.ca;1 conterparts. ii Tasmanians, be'ii.ng in the t rf::,_i tion period 
after the war were payoh~logioally and ~hysioally unprepared to 
meet the ··challenge of influenza.. Their-" attempts to do so is an 
heroic example of ma.n's ability to climb from the depths of despair 
and•••• ultimately overborne. 
i d 
,I !l tl 
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